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Abstract 
 
The ongoing American popular perception that the United States committed significant 
intelligence failures during Korean War is certainly understandable, especially given that this 
view continues to persist within the scholarly consensus on the topic. However, historian Richard 
C. Thornton asserts compelling arguments to the contrary, which, when combined with careful 
examination of the relevant primary source evidence, help to unravel how conscious American 
policy decisions can explain these supposed intelligence failures. Moreover, a comparative 
analysis of the U.S. use of intelligence during the Korean conflict relative to that of its three 
communist adversaries—North Korea, China, and Russia—reveals not only that the U.S. did not 
commit any significant intelligence failures, but leveraged intelligence much more effectively 
during the North Korean invasion, Chinese intervention, and in the pursuit of strategic goals.  
 An application of John A. Gentry’s intelligence failure analysis methodology further 
reveals that the three communist nations’ failures can all be directly attributed to their respective 
leaders, while intelligence agencies bare the blame for supposed U.S. failures. These results 
suggest a fundamental difference between the U.S. and the other three nations’ approaches to the 
use of intelligence. The communist nations relied on the abilities of one man to leverage all of 
the available intelligence in his decisions, while the American approach was one of policy-driven 
interpretation and action on intelligence. This difference in approaches to intelligence seems to 
explain how the U.S. managed to avoid the mistakes so frequently made by its adversaries, and 
why the U.S. used intelligence so much more effectively relative to the three communist nations.   
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Introduction 
 
Within American public perception, and even among many past and current historians, 
the notion that the Korean War encompassed some glaring examples of U.S. intelligence failures 
persists.1 Chief among these allegations are that U.S. intelligence failed to predict and provide 
adequate warning of the two key events during the conflict—the June 1950 North Korean 
invasion south of the 38th parallel, and the November 1950 Chinese military intervention in the 
war. Critics of U.S. intelligence performance include these “failures” among a list of notable 
mishaps in American military history, ranging from Pearl Harbor in 1941, to the Tet Offensive of 
1968, and into the twenty-first century, with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  
However, a comparative analysis of the U.S. and its three primary adversaries in the 
Korean War— Russia, China, and North Korea—and their corresponding use of intelligence in 
key decisions surrounding these two major events, reveals that the U.S. used such information 
more effectively than these adversaries. Further, similar comparative analyses of each nation’s 
use of intelligence towards meeting its overall strategic objectives for entering the conflict 
strongly indicate that the U.S. leveraged intelligence much more successfully and achieved its 
goals to a greater degree than any of the three communist nations it faced during the war.  
                                                         
1 For historians’ assertions alleging U.S. intelligence failures during the Korean War, see, for example, 
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During 
the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) Kindle Edition, 107; Christopher Andrew, For the 
President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1995) 185; Sergei N. Goncharov, John. W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, 
and the Korean War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 170; and Michael Sheng, “Mao’s Role in the 
Korean Conflict: A Revision,” Twentieth Century China 39, no. 3 (September 2014): 270, accessed December 7, 
2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1179/1521538514Z.00000000048. 
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*** 
The Korean War began with the initial North Korean attack in June 1950, as the 
communist North Korean Leader, Kim Il Sung, flung his forces across the 38th parallel in an 
effort to overthrow the U.S.-allied South Korean Republic of Korea (ROK) government and 
unify the Korean peninsula under his control.2 Kim’s military received training, war planning 
guidance, and logistical support from Stalin’s Soviet Union, and his North Korean forces 
experienced initial success, pushing the ROK and U.S. forces to the southeastern corner of the 
peninsula and surrounded the remaining ROK and U.S. forces at Pusan by the fall of 1950. 3 The 
American public, harboring fresh concerns following the dual events of the Soviets’ successful 
test of a nuclear weapon and the establishment of a communist Chinese state in 1949, 
undoubtedly fretted over how the Truman administration could be caught so apparently flat-
footed in the face of communist expansion.4  
 Then, on September 15, 1950, General MacArthur conducted a successful 
amphibious landing at Inchon, just west of Seoul, and U.S.-led United Nations (U.N.) forces 
began pushing the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel.5 A few months thereafter, in 
November 1950, Mao ordered several hundred thousand Chinese troops into North Korea, and 
these forces soon began engaging U.S. forces.6 While historians diverge on the extent to which 
                                                         
2 Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2010) Kindle Edition, 
Location 325. 
3 Sergei N. Goncharov, John. W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean 
War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 147; Cumings, 451-453. 
4 Kathryn Weathersby, “Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New 
Evidence from Russian Archives,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International 
History Project (November 1993), 6, accessed March 10, 2017, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Working_Paper_8.pdf. 
5 Cumings, Locations 489-90. 
6 Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2010) Kindle 
Edition,.Locations 634-7. 
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American intelligence understood and warned of the threat posed by Chinese intervention, the 
predominant, consensus view argues that U.S. intelligence failed to give policymakers accurate 
Chinese personnel strength estimates or adequate warning of the threat.7  
*** 
As of the writing of this work in the spring of 2017, the historiography of the Korean War 
and the use of intelligence within that conflict appears to lack a focused scholarly effort to 
comparatively analyze the U.S. use of intelligence during the Korean conflict relative to that of 
the three primary nations allied against it: North Korea, China, and Russia. Without such 
analysis to provide comparative context, many historians and the public alike appear 
unreasonably critical of any perceived or actual lack of warning from American intelligence of a 
significant event or attack.  As intelligence scholar John A. Gentry explains, “Chronic 
perceptions of failure suggest that unless American intelligence professionals are much more 
incompetent than even harsh critics suggest, a basic problem lies in inappropriate expectations 
about the performance of U.S. intelligence agencies.”8 Comparative analyses of American, North 
Korean, Chinese, and Russian uses of intelligence in decisions surrounding the initial North 
Korean invasion, the Chinese military intervention, as well as of these nations’ efforts towards 
                                                         
7 For examples from the consensus view of the U.S. intelligence failure to predict Chinese intervention, see 
Goncharov et al., 170 and Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: An Interpretative History (London: Routledge, 1999), 
111-2, 
http://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=84679&site
=eds-live&scope=site; For examples of assertions arguing that U.S. intelligence accurately warned policymakers of 
the Chinese intervention, see Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the 
Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 350-1 and Arthur H. Mitchell, Understanding the Korean War 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2013), 180, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.ezproxy.snhu.edu/lib/snhu-
ebooks/detail.action?docID=1336666. 
8 John A. Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed,” Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 
247, accessed January 22, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20203011.  
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achieving their respective strategic war aims, provides the potential for a balanced context from 
which historians may make objective assessments of all four governments’ relative effectiveness.  
*** 
As the focus of this paper will center on various nations’ use of intelligence, it seems that 
a clear, relevant definition of the term “intelligence” as it pertains to the subject matter at hand is 
a prerequisite to forming any meaningful arguments involving this term. In a 1958 article 
published in a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) publication, Charles T. Bimfort asserts, 
“Intelligence is the collecting and processing of that information about foreign countries and 
their agents which is needed by a government for its foreign policy and for national security, the 
conduct of non-attributable activities abroad to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy, 
and the protection of both process and product, as well as persons and organizations concerned 
with these, against unauthorized disclosure.”9 The key points in Bimfort’s definition are that 
intelligence involves not only the collection, analysis, and dissemination, but also the protection 
of information and the collectors thereof which facilitate a given nation’s ability to conduct 
foreign policy and ensure national security (to include combat operations) with or against other 
nations.  
Bimfort also notes that intelligence need not necessarily derive from covert or secret 
action, although it obviously includes such information, and that it encompasses the protection of 
internal “processes and product,” or how a nation collects, analyzes, and disseminates strategic 
                                                         
9 Charles T. Bimfort, “A Definition of Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence 2, no. 4 (Fall 1958): 78, 
accessed February 7, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol2no4/html/v02i4a08p_0001.htm. 
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information, as well as preventing the release of finished documents to unauthorized audiences.10 
In short, intelligence involves the use of any information which one nation can use to gain 
advantage over other nations, and it is on this simplified definition that this paper will base 
relative arguments. As the historical record of the Korean conflict indicates, the diplomatic and 
military interactions between the U.S., North Korea, China, and Russia rarely, if ever, prove 
detached from intelligence.  
*** 
Given the prevalent role which intelligence, as defined above, played within these 
nations’ interrelations during the war, an ample amount of primary and secondary sources exist 
through which to comparatively analyze the four countries’ use of this information within the 
contexts of specific events and their respective strategic goals. Thus, this paper seeks to address 
two critical questions: First, how credible are the allegations that the U.S. committed intelligence 
failures in its inability to predict or prepare for the North Korean invasion of June 1950 and the 
Chinese military intervention of November 1950? Second, how effective was the U.S. use of 
intelligence during the conflict relative to that of North Korea, China, and Russia? Through a 
careful examination of all four nations’ actions through the three distinct contexts of the North 
Korean invasion, the Chinese intervention, and each country’s strategic war aims, the totality of 
the evidence strongly suggests that while U.S. intelligence agencies suffered from systemic 
dysfunction, and certainly made tactical errors, its use of intelligence during those two key 
events did not constitute intelligence failures. Further, the analysis reveals that the U.S. not only 
                                                         
10 Charles T. Bimfort, “A Definition of Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence 2, no. 4 (Fall 1958): 78, 
accessed February 7, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/vol2no4/html/v02i4a08p_0001.htm. 
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proved more effective than all three of its main adversaries in its use of strategic information 
during those two crucial events, but it also proved the most successful of the four in achieving its 
overall strategic objectives for the war through intelligence. 
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Chapter 1: Odd Man Out(side) of the Consensus: Richard C. Thornton 
 
Within the rather narrow topical scope of the use of intelligence surrounding the two 
pivotal events in the first year of the Korean War, one historian stands out as the chief dissenting 
opinion, arguing against the scholarly consensus view that the U.S. failed in its predictive 
analysis and issuance of early warnings for these events. In his 2000 Odd Man Out: Truman, 
Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War, Richard C. Thornton cites numerous pertinent 
primary sources to support his arguments that U.S. intelligence not only detected and predicted 
both of these impending threats, but issued advanced warning of these developments to U.S. 
policymakers and war planners.  
For instance, Thornton notes that U.S. Army War Plan SL-17, which “‘was approved, 
printed and distributed to the General Staff and the technical services early in the week of 19 
June, 1950,’” (six days prior to the North Korean invasion) details “an assumed invasion by the 
North, ‘a retreat to and defense of the Pusan perimeter, buildup and breakout and an amphibious 
landing at Inchon to cut enemy supply lines.’”1 Such use of a primary source to compellingly 
argue that U.S. intelligence was not only aware of the impending North Korean invasion, but 
                                                         
1 Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War 
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 181, 180; For a discussion of SL-17 relative to South Korean preparations for 
the invasion, as well as MacArthur’s Inchon landings, see Myunglim Park, “The ‘American Boundary’, Provocation, 
and the Outbreak of the Korean War,” Social Science Japan Journal 1, no. 1 (1998): 52-5, accessed May 28, 2017, 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.snhu.edu/stable/30209237; For translated excerpts from South Korean Army plans 
which reflect U.S. War Plan SL-17, see “Yukgun chakjôn myôngryông 38ho’ (Army Headquarters Strategic Order 
No. 38) (March 25, 1950),” “Yukgun che 6 sadan chakjôn myôngryông 42ho’” (Army 6th Division Strategic Order 
No. 42) (May 18, 1950), Kukpangbu chônpyôn’ui saryo che 562 ho, che 740 ho (Ministry of Defense Materials of 
War History Compilation Committee, Document Nos. 562 and 740) , as cited in Park 53-4; For a classified U.S. 
Department of Defense study linked to SL-17, see “Mobilization Requirements Program of the Army Logistic Study 
for Projected Operations (LD-SL-17),” National Archives, Records Group 319, E 97, Army: Operations General 
Decimal File 1950–1951 091, Korea Box 34, also cited in Park, 53-4. 
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predicted it and produced war plans accordingly, exemplifies much of Thornton’s approach to 
the topical debate of whether the U.S. committed intelligence failures during the war.  
Beyond this extremely detailed, and what would prove prophetic war plan, Thornton 
points to the pre-invasion U.S. intelligence discovery of a “massive Soviet supply effort” to 
North Korea, which by some estimates included 65 Russian T-34 tanks.2 Thornton also explains 
that in late April 1950, “Under the command of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, former 
commander of the U.S. Army in Korea,” “the U.S. Army and Air Force jointly carried out 
Operation Swarmer, a 60,000-man, 600-plane exercise designed to…air drop a multi-division 
armed force, specifically to stop a tank-led assault.”3 That the U.S. military held this training 
exercise just three months prior to the North Korean invasion, it was specifically designed to halt 
a tank-led assault, and that the former commander of U.S. Army forces in Korea led it, all 
strongly point to U.S. preparations for, and thus prior knowledge of, a North Korean assault 
across the 38th parallel.  
Further, Thornton states, “…in what was a remarkable coincidence if the invasion was 
truly unexpected, the day before the North Korean attack, the U.S. Army alerted ‘all combat 
units of the Army…for tests that will determine how quickly they could start moving toward 
ports of embarkation in an emergency.’”4 A prophetic war plan, the intelligence discovery of 
large shipments of tanks from Russia to North Korea, a training exercise to combat a tank-led 
                                                         
2 Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War 
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 109. 
3 Ibid., 178. 
4 Ibid, 181. Thornton cites a June 25, 1950 New York Times article reporting on this Army-wide alert status. 
For this article, see “Army Combat Units Alerted for Tests,” The New York Times (New York, NY), June 25, 1950, 
accessed May 28, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/1950/06/25/archives/army-combat-units-alerted-for-tests-
maneuver-will-show-readiness-to.html. 
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assault, and an Army-wide test the day before the actual invasion designed to prepare for an 
emergency all strongly suggest that U.S. intelligence detected and warned policymakers of the 
impending North Korean invasion, and that war planners were preparing accordingly. 
Despite Thornton’s persuasive arguments, the majority of historians addressing the North 
Korean invasion offer opposing views on the matter, maintaining that invasion caught U.S. 
intelligence off guard, and that the Truman administration was unaware of the potential for such 
an attack. This consensus view may be seen in Melvyn P. Leffler’s assertion that, “News of the 
invasion triggered alarm bells in Washington…,” and in Marvin L. Kalb’s contention that 
Truman was “shocked” by the news of the invasion.5 As these examples reflect, the assertions 
from the consensus often reference anecdotal reactions to the North Korean attack, whereas 
Thornton bases his arguments on the implications of primary source evidence directly pertinent 
to and reflective of the event.  
As one reads the historiography of the Korean War, despite questions raised by such 
points from Thornton and others, it becomes apparent that many historians simply accept the 
notion that U.S. intelligence failed to detect and warn American policymakers of the impending 
North Korean attack. The majority of historians, it seems, perceive it as “common knowledge” 
that the North Korean invasion was a surprise to the American public, leadership, and 
intelligence alike. Those historians that do cite credible sources to support claims that U.S. 
intelligence failed in this regard often cite CIA assessments, resulting in conclusions which can 
                                                         
5 Melvyn P. Leffler, The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-
1953 (New York: Hill & Wang, 1994), Kindle Edition, Locations 1478-80; Marvin L. Kalb, The Road to War: 
Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2013) p14, 
accessed March 14, 2017, 
http://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=577350&site
=ehost-live&scope=site&ebv=EB&ppid=pp_C1. 
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prove to be based on incomplete data and context, as will become apparent later in this chapter, 
and receive detailed attention in Chapter 2. 
Regarding the Chinese military intervention into the war, Thornton makes two key claims 
which starkly contrast with the consensus perspective that U.S. intelligence failed to detect, 
predict, and warn policymakers of this significant development which so significantly impacted 
the Korean combat theater.  First, Thornton argues that by November 1950, “the huge 
deployment of [Chinese] troops border crossing points, the growing volume of communication 
between Beijing and its forces as well as signals intercepts of those communications, clearly 
revealed Beijing’s preparations to intervene.”6 Thornton argues that “one could not seriously 
argue” that U.S. military signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities at this stage of the war were 
so insufficient to fail in the detection of such communications, and that it was preposterous to 
conclude that the presence and implications of the substantial Chinese troop buildup recently 
staged near the Yalu River border area between China and Korea went unnoticed or reported to 
U.S. policymakers.7  
On this particular issue involving U.S. SIGINT capabilities at the time of the Chinese 
intervention in Korea, a number of historians argue against Thornton’s position. For example, in 
his 1995 For the President’s Eyes Only, Christopher Andrew asserts, “The SIGINT warning 
before the Chinese offensive was…confused. The rapid expansion of SIGINT activities after the 
outbreak of war had produced…interservice rivalry.”8 However, while Andrew alludes to the 
dysfunction resulting from the rivalry between U.S. agencies conducting SIGINT collection 
                                                         
6 Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War 
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 351. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency 
from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 190. 
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operations, and places the blame for the “confused” warning of the Chinese intervention on this 
rivalry, the author provides no concrete examples of how these inter-agency tensions negatively 
impacted SIGINT warnings of the offensive.9 In fact, Andrew notes that Truman’s Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs at the time of the Chinese military offensive, Dean 
Rusk, admitted, “‘Our intelligence did detect some movement of Chinese troops…,’” and 
Andrew even acknowledges, “The most important intelligence came from SIGINT.”10 
Inexplicably, Andrew seems to include alleged U.S. SIGINT inadequacies in the blame for the 
“…false assumptions about total Soviet control of the entire Communist world that the White 
House did not question.”11 While such assumptions represent possible errors in policymakers’ 
interpretations of intelligence, they provide no evidence of, nor does Andrew in his book, of 
insufficient warning of the Chinese military intervention from U.S. SIGINT sources. 
In his 2013 Understanding the Korean War, Arthur H. Mitchell makes a crucial point of 
differentiating between the relative SIGINT successes of the CIA and other intelligence 
agencies, notably the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). Mitchell notes that during the 
Korean conflict, the CIA “…made various claims about penetrating Communist communications 
and mobilizing anti–Communist elements in North Korea. With a few exceptions, however, its 
operations were failures.”12 However, Mitchell also notes, “Although the Chinese armies moving 
north observed radio silence, beginning in July 1950 an [AFSA] listening post on Okinawa 
                                                         
9 Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency 
from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 189-91. 
10 Ibid., 189. Remarkably, Rusk seems to contradict these statements, claiming, “No one, including myself, 
foresaw any chance of Chinese intervention.” For further details, see Dean Rusk, As I Saw It, ed. Daniel S. Papp, 
(London: Penguin Books, 1991), 162. 
11 Andrew, 190. 
12 Arthur H. Mitchell, Understanding the Korean War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2013), 181, 
accessed February 22, 2017, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.ezproxy.snhu.edu/lib/snhu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1336666. 
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indicated that the Chinese were moving hundreds of thousands of soldiers to Manchuria.”13 
Further, Mitchell explains, the AFSA intercepted two crucial communications indicative of a 
Chinese intervention in Korea: “One, in early November [1950], was a radiotelephone call made 
by an Eastern European reporting that Chinese soldiers were being urged to volunteer to fight in 
Korea, as ‘we are already at war there.’ A transmission in mid–November [1950] requesting 
30,000 copies of maps of Korea clearly indicated that the Chinese were about to make a move.”14 
Clearly, U.S. intelligence detected and warned policymakers of the impending Chinese 
offensive, although, the author states, “MacArthur and company obviously refused to credit these 
reports.”15 Perhaps of equal significance, Mitchell’s differentiation between CIA SIGINT 
detection and warning of the attack with that of other U.S. intelligence agencies such as the 
AFSA highlights that historians citing only CIA intelligence reporting and assessments in their 
accusations of U.S. intelligence failures during the Korean War likely lack the full context of 
intelligence available to U.S. political and military decision makers. 
Thornton’s second primary point of divergence from the consensus perspective 
concerning the Chinese military intervention involves the interactions between President Truman 
and General MacArthur following MacArthur’s September 15, 1950 landing at Inchon until the 
U.S. acknowledgement of Chinese military involvement on the peninsula in November 1950. 
Thornton contends that during the meeting between Truman and MacArthur on Wake Island, 
“Truman must have warned MacArthur not to acknowledge the early presence of ‘major’ 
Chinese forces in Korea should he encounter them, lest the [United Nations] allies demand a 
                                                         
13 Arthur H. Mitchell, Understanding the Korean War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2013), 180, 
accessed February 22, 2017, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.ezproxy.snhu.edu/lib/snhu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1336666. 
14 Ibid., 181. 
15 Ibid. 
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premature withdrawal.”16 Thornton bases this argument on primary source documents which 
reveal fluctuations in MacArthur’s intelligence estimates of Chinese troop numbers fighting in 
Korea from before and after the Wake Island meeting.17 Thornton notes that prior to the Wake 
Island meeting between Truman and MacArthur, “MacArthur’s intelligence chief, General 
Willoughby, had reported heavy concentrations of Chinese troops, between 90,000 and 180,000, 
‘massed at the border crossing points.”18 However, Thornton points out, “On November 2, after 
Chinese troops in division strength had been identified in Korea (press accounts reported from 
20,000 to 40,00) Willoughby estimated that only 16,500 Chinese troops were actually in 
Korea.”19 Thornton’s conclusion provides a possible explanation for the discrepancy in Chinese 
troop strength estimates. 
Beyond Truman’s anxiety over losing the support of U.N. allies in the Korean theater 
should the full reality of Chinese military forces be revealed, Thornton explains that MacArthur 
skewed his own Chinese troop estimates to reflect those from the CIA, to which Truman 
adhered. Thornton states, “Truman’s instructions to MacArthur at Wake Island, it is fair to 
conclude, were based on the interpretation that while the Chinese were massing troops at border 
crossing points, they were not prepared for a full-scale intervention in 1950. That was the CIA’s 
view. Therefore, MacArthur should move quickly and present the Chinese with a fait 
accompli.”20 However, Thornton points out that MacArthur “was plainly dubious” of the CIA 
assessment of Chinese intentions, as his own ‘unsurpassed’ intelligence “reported a capability to 
                                                         
16 Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War 
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 359. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid, 361. 
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intervene,” and, as Mitchell illuminates in his book, undoubtedly included AFSA SIGINT 
intercepts indicating an imminent, if not forgone, Chinese intervention.21 Nonetheless, Thornton 
continues, if MacArthur’s “commander-in-chief urged him forward, as follows, promised to 
support him, he would obey.”22 Thus, as Thornton’s line of argument follows, MacArthur 
consciously ignored the intelligence which his own command provided him, and which had 
detected and warned him of the Chinese military intervention, in order to align with the views 
and direct orders of his President. Although the CIA provided Truman with flawed 
interpretations of Chinese intentions in Korea, and MacArthur acquiesced to form war plans 
based on these assessments, it was not the only U.S. intelligence entity tasked with assessing the 
Korean situation.   
In his 2015 book, Intelligence Failure in Korea, Major Justin M. Haynes places the 
ultimate blame for alleged U.S. intelligence failures surrounding the Chinese intervention in 
Korea with Major General Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur’s chief intelligence officer in the 
Far East Command (FEC). Haynes notes, “By November 7[,1950], many leaders in the field, at 
MacArthur’s headquarters in Japan, and in the halls of Washington understood that the People’s 
Liberation Army had committed substantial combat forces to the Korean Peninsula.”23 Haynes 
continues, “Despite this knowledge, Willoughby did not determine that the [Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army] was preparing to execute a counteroffensive to defeat the UN advance into 
                                                         
21 Ibid; Arthur H. Mitchell, Understanding the Korean War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2013), 
180, accessed February 22, 2017, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.ezproxy.snhu.edu/lib/snhu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1336666. 
22 Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War 
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 359. 
23 Justin M. Haynes, Intelligence Failure in Korea: Major General Charles A. Willoughby’s Role in the 
United Nations Command’s Defeat in November 1950 (United States: Pickle Publishing, 2015), Kindle Edition, 
Locations 252-4. 
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North Korea.”24 The question of why such a senior intelligence officer would fail to reflect such 
commonly held knowledge in his intelligence assessments to MacArthur seems to find at least a 
potential answer in Thornton’s explanation. If one accepts the arguably most plausible portion 
Thornton’s argument-- that Truman directed MacArthur to evade acknowledgement of the 
presence of substantial Chinese combat forces in Korea in order to avoid the potential for a 
premature withdrawal of U.N. allied forces from the Korean theater-- it would follow that 
MacArthur ordered his subordinate, Willoughby, to deflate Chinese troop estimates and withhold 
any predictions for outright intervention accordingly. 
In the book, Haynes provides detailed comparative analysis of intelligence assessments 
from the CIA and Willoughby’s FEC Intelligence Section (G2) during the months leading up to 
and following the Chinese intervention. In one such example, Haynes notes, “The CIA published 
a memorandum for President Truman on November 1, providing an estimate of Chinese 
capabilities and intent that mirrored Willoughby’s analysis at that time.”25 This analysis from 
Haynes aligns with Thornton’s argument that on October 15, 1950 at Wake Island, Truman 
directed MacArthur to avoid acknowledging the presence major Chinese combat forces in Korea, 
effectively ordering MacArthur to ensure FEC G2 intelligence assessments reflected those from 
the CIA. Indeed, in one of Haynes’ focal arguments, the author asserts that, “Willoughby’s 
flawed assessment of Chinese intentions in the fall of 1950 was a result of rampant mirror 
imaging, complicated by circular analysis…”26 To support this claim, Haynes asserts that during 
this period, “Analysis embedded in the CIA documents directly reflected the FEC G2’s reporting 
                                                         
24 Ibid, 254-5. 
25 Justin M. Haynes, Intelligence Failure in Korea: Major General Charles A. Willoughby’s Role in the 
United Nations Command’s Defeat in November 1950 (United States: Pickle Publishing, 2015), Kindle Edition, 
Locations 441-2. 
26 Ibid, Locations 46-7. 
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that refuted the possibility of Chinese entry into the war.”27 Perhaps, in his efforts to prove 
Willoughby’s primary culpability in failing to predict Chinese intentions to intervene in Korea, 
Haynes overlooks the possibility that instead of the CIA documents reflecting those from the 
FEC G2, it was the inverse.  
Given Thornton’s arguments, Truman’s directive to MacArthur would have necessitated 
that Willoughby adhere to the CIA view that the Chinese would not intervene in 1950 in his 
assessments. Further, evidence which Mitchell presents regarding AFSA SIGINT detection and 
warning of the impending Chinese intervention clearly underlines that U.S. intelligence provided 
prior warning of the Chinese intervention. Similarly, Thornton’s points regarding the prophetic 
War Plan SL-17, Operation Swarmer, U.S. intelligence discovery of the Soviet provision of T-34 
tanks to North Korea, and an Army-wide emergency test the day before the North Korean 
invasion, all cumulatively argue that U.S. intelligence detected and warned policymakers of the 
imminent North Korean invasion. Despite systemic dysfunction and questionable decisions from 
policymakers, one can thus reasonably conclude that neither of these two major events of the 
early Korean War constituted U.S. “intelligence failures”.  
*** 
While Thornton’s book offers a refreshing approach to the Korean War, challenging 
many consensus views long held by historians of the topic, and including perspectives from 
Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il Sung alongside those of Truman, it also highlights that even such a 
unique work ultimately proves U.S.-centric, and lacks consistent parallel comparisons between 
the pertinent nations. Other prominent works within the historiography, notably Goncharov et 
                                                         
27 Ibid, Locations 334-5. 
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al.’s Uncertain Partners, wherein the authors focus on the strategic interrelations of Mao, Stalin, 
and Kim Il-Sung, center on the communist adversaries of the U.S., but lack relative comparisons. 
Beyond this and a few other exceptions, the vast majority of the historical texts on the Korean 
War appear to take an America-centric perspective, resulting in relatively less detailed 
discussions of the other nations involved in the conflict. Moreover, and more specific to this 
effort’s theme and arguments, the topic’s historiography lacks systematic comparative analyses 
of the war’s most impactful nations’ use of intelligence and the effectiveness thereof.  
The process of determining whether allegations of U.S. “intelligence failures” prove 
credible when examined through the lenses of Thornton and other historians’ arguments has 
helped to identify this comparative analysis gap within the topic’s historiography. As the three 
primary U.S. adversaries in the Korean War, it seems logical to include North Korea, China, and 
Russia in such a comparative analysis, along with the U.S. itself.  
Chapter 2 will focus on each of these four nations, assessing their respective use of 
intelligence within the context of the North Korean invasion of June 1950, while Chapter 3 will 
follow the same methodology using the Chinese military intervention of November 1950 as a 
baseline. Chapter 4 will assess each nation’s overall strategic objectives and respective success in 
leveraging intelligence to achieve these goals. Individually and collectively, these analyses 
indicate that the U.S. proved more effective in conducting intelligence operations than its 
communist adversaries during both of these major events, as well as in achieving its overall 
strategic objectives for the war. 
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Chapter 2: The North Korean Invasion 
 
 
Figure 1: Destroyed NKA T-34 outside Kimpo Airfield, September 17, 1950.1 
                                                         
1 “T-34 tank destroyed by 5th Marines on the road to Kimpo Airfield, 17 September 1950,” USMC 
Archives, accessed May 19, 2017, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Destroyed_T-
34_Tank,_17_September_1950_(15930053232).jpg. In the weeks preceding the invasion, U.S. intelligence 
estimated that the North Koreans staged at least 65 of these tanks in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. Soviet data 
suggests that the NKA possessed as many as 258 of the T-34s. Either way U.S. and ROK forces suffered from a 
severe lack of countermeasures on hand in Korea at the onset of the invasion.  For a discussion of these U.S. 
estimates and this lack of tank countermeasure equipment, see Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, 
Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 109, 170-2; For a review of NKA 
tank numbers gleaned from a Soviet Army General Staff document of the period, see Sergei N. Goncharov, John. W. 
Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1993), 147. 
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The invasion which the North Korean Army (NKA) conducted as it thrust south of the 
38th parallel on June 25, 1950 stands as one of the most dramatic events in modern military 
history. Despite the apparent prevailing view among current Western historians that the invasion 
occurred without adequate detection or warning from U.S. intelligence entities and thus 
constituted a key “intelligence failure,” historians such as Thornton and Mitchell offer 
compelling evidence and logical arguments to the contrary. Further, the literature on the topic 
appears to lack parallel comparisons of U.S. intelligence efforts with those of its chief 
adversaries in the conflict—North Korea, China, and Russia. In attempt to fill that 
historiographical gap, the following will provide an individual analysis of each of these nation’s 
intelligence operations pertaining to the NKA invasion. 
*** 
The historical evidence available as of the writing of this document does not portray 
North Korea and its Korean War-era leader, Kim Il Sung, favorably by any reasonable measure. 
In their book detailing the Stalin-Mao dynamic during the conflict, Goncharov et al. cite their 
interview with Yoo Sung Chul, a NKA general involved in the war planning for the invasion, in 
which Yoo explains, “‘The Korean War was planned to last only a few days, so we did not plan 
anything in case things might go wrong.’”2 Further, Yoo explains that Soviet military advisers 
designed these war plans entirely, providing them to Kim Il Sung for his approval.3 This lack of 
contingency planning displays a conscious North Korean decision to ignore potential issues or 
threats to the invasion’s operational objectives, and thus a serious error in its intelligence 
                                                         
 
 
2 Sergei N. Goncharov, John. W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean 
War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 155. 
3 Ibid, 150. 
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preparation of the battlefield.  As John Lewis Gaddis explains in Strategies of Containment, the 
U.S. was “…in a relatively favorable position to deal with the Korean crisis, since it had air, 
ground, and naval forces stationed close by” in occupied Japan, a fact which Kim and his NKA 
generals were undoubtedly fully aware, but for which they nonetheless planned no 
contingencies.4 
In their 2012 Arc of Empire, Michael Hunt and Steven Levine point out that Kim’s 
overestimation of NKA capabilities and miscalculation that the U.S. would intervene with 
substantial troop commitments constitute serious judgement errors in the face of available 
information.5 The authors assert that prior to the southward attack, Kim “…concluded that the 
North Korean army could conquer the South in a matter of weeks. The risk of American 
intervention seemed slight.”6 Here, again, Kim and his military leaders failed to account for the 
nearby American occupation forces in Japan, which made the likelihood of U.S. intervention 
more feasible, while a U.S. military invasion of Korea made Kim’s prediction of a quick NKA 
victory equally unlikely. Kim’s miscalculations involving enemy troop strength and dispositions 
indicate ineffective use of intelligence information. 
Goncharov and his fellow authors also note that NKA acquiescence to Soviet military 
plans and directives negatively impacted the NKA’s ability to relay strategic information on the 
battlefield and between units.7 In another interview, an NKA officer describes this situation as 
                                                         
4 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National  
Security Policy During the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) Kindle Edition, 108. 
5 Michael Hunt, and Steven Levine, Arc of Empire: America’s Wars in Asia from the Philippines to 
Vietnam. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 106, accessed February 27, 2017, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.ezproxy.snhu.edu/lib/snhu-ebooks/detail.action?docID=837883. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Sergei N. Goncharov, John. W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean 
War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 155. 
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NKA units first occupied Seoul, stating, “Communications between divisions, corps, and armies 
were disconnected. Each unit moved on its own, and each had its own plan.”8 Such a lack of vital 
communication capability brought on by poor planning undoubtedly greatly hindered North 
Korean intelligence collection and dissemination efforts between large combat units, 
representing yet another significant mismanagement of intelligence operations during the NKA 
invasion. 
Throughout the topic’s historiography, the singular positive use of intelligence attributed 
to North Korea during the initial invasion appears to pertain to Kim’s independent decision to 
conduct the attack and capitalize on the element of surprise, leaving even his Chinese, though not 
his Soviet allies uninformed of his planned time of attack.9 As Gaddis explains in We Now 
Know: Rethinking Cold War History, “The invasion, when it came, caught [Mao] as well as the 
South Koreans and the Americans off guard.”10 Despite this nod to North Korean information 
security in maintaining operational secrecy, however, Gaddis goes on to explain that, “…then it 
was the turn of the North Koreans, the Soviets, and much of the rest of the world to be surprised 
by the swiftness and decisiveness with which the United States came to the assistance of South 
Korea.”11 This point recalls the previously stated arguments regarding Kim and his military 
leadership’s  overestimation of NKA capabilities and underestimation of the American military 
commitment to its South Korean ally. Even while successfully maintaining the element of 
surprise when initiating the invasion south of the 38th parallel, Kim and his leadership had badly 
misinterpreted the swiftness of American military deployment capabilities and general U.S. 
                                                         
8 Ibid. 
9 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 75. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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intentions in the event of a North Korean attack south. Arguably to a greater extent than any of 
the other three nations, North Korea mishandled its use of intelligence during this initial invasion 
in June 1950. 
*** 
The involvement of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) he led during 
the initial NKA assault south is one best described as simultaneously indirect, yet untenably 
intertwined with Soviet and North Korean agendas. Alexander Pantsov and Steven I. Levine 
explain that as early as January 1950, under the urging of Stalin, Mao promised to help the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), “‘strengthen its defenses,’” despite that Stalin 
“said nothing to Mao about a possible invasion of South Korea.”12 The authors further note that 
on May 13, 1950, “…Mao again gave his full agreement to support the unification by military 
means,” despite on only that same day having received a briefing from Kim on the NKA 
invasion plan.13 In fact, Mao made these commitments of military support to the NKA (though 
perhaps more accurately, to Stalin) despite Stalin’s overt insistence that Kim keep the invasion 
plans from the “‘Chinese comrades.’”14 Mao’s repeated commitments of Chinese military 
support to the DPRK, despite having no apparent concept of what type of circumstances such a 
commitment might entail, indicates a clear recklessness and disregard on the chairman’s part. 
Such a request from Stalin, and by proxy, Kim, represents a clear instance which warranted the 
collection of relevant intelligence in order to make an informed decision on a matter with such 
                                                         
12 Alexander V. Pantsov, and Steven I. Levine, Mao: The Real Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012), 
377.  
13 Ibid, 379. 
14 Ibid, 377. 
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significant geopolitical implications. Mao’s failure to do so constitutes a profound misjudgment 
in the use of intelligence involving the North Korean invasion.  
Interviews of NKA officers which Goncharov and his co-authors conducted attest to the 
Russians and the North Koreans going to great lengths to keep their Chinese allies ignorant of 
specifics regarding the planned NKA offensive.15 As these historians note, “…a former senior 
North Korean supply officer vividly recalls that before the outbreak of the war, all Soviet 
weapons were transported to the DPRK by sea instead of by rail through Chinese territory for the 
specific purpose of denying the Chinese any hard intelligence about the North’s preparations.”16 
Again, Mao’s military commitments to his so-called allies, unwilling to even share information 
regarding weapons shipments, amount to a “blank check” for a mystery product. Stated less 
metaphorically, Mao promised an unspecified measure of military support for an undisclosed 
military operation. As intelligence involves the use of strategic information to gain advantage 
over one or more other nations, to include the protection and withholding of such information, it 
seems that in this specific scenario, Stalin and Kim effectively leveraged intelligence to their 
own advantage and to the detriment of Mao and the CCP.  
In his 1994 China’s Road to the Korean War, Jian Chen identifies three key factors 
which Mao and his fellow CCP leaders overlooked in their strategic calculus of American Far 
East policy, right up until the U.S. intervened following the NKA offensive in June 1950. First, 
Chen notes, “…the United States government had intimate ties with the Syngman Rhee [South 
Korean] government…South Korea’s close connections with Japan made it less likely that the 
                                                         
15 Sergei N. Goncharov, John. W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean 
War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 155. 
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United States would tolerate its destruction.”17 Second, “…the failure to maintain a non-
Communist China caused severe criticism of the Truman administration at home…To President 
Truman, an appeasement policy towards the North Korean invasion could mean political 
suicide.”18 Third, and lastly, “The U.S. East Asian policy had quietly changed in early 1950. The 
CCP’s victory in China, together with the Soviet possession of the atomic bomb, changed the 
world balance of power…Consequently, [U.S. policymakers] believed that the U.S. should not 
allow further expansion of Soviet influence in any part of the world, including the Asian-Pacific 
area.”19 To so badly misread three such impactful factors suggests that CCP intelligence efforts 
lacked effective collection and analysis of intelligence regarding American diplomatic (South 
Korea and Japan), domestic political (homeland views of Truman’s failure to keep China free of 
communism), and national security issues (rise of the CCP and the Soviet nuclear state). Chen’s 
detailed, thoroughly researched, and logically supported arguments reflect the new Chinese 
regime’s relative naiveté concerning geopolitics in general and foreign intelligence operations 
specifically. However, in assessing the effectiveness of a nation’s intelligence operations, there is 
no sliding scale for inexperience or extra points for ideological zeal. Mao and the CCP neglected 
to prioritize their understanding of changing American policies and attitudes, and as a result, 
their expectations for little to no American reaction to the NKA invasion vanished as the reality 
of a decisive U.S. diplomatic and military response culminated within days of the attack. 
Underestimating the American reaction to this degree translates to a serious Chinese strategic 
                                                         
17 Jian Chen, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 126, accessed April 1, 2017, 
http://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=79596&site
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18 Ibid. 
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error in leveraging available information to effectively inform the CCP’s decisions surrounding 
the NKA invasion. 
Extensive research within the relevant historical literature fails to yield a scholarly work 
which provides an example in which Mao’s use of intelligence may be deemed reasonably 
laudable or worthy of positive characterization. As the unrivaled leader of the CCP and thus 
China, Mao’s lack of access to, or deliberate abstention from, the use of traditional intelligence 
collected from foreign adversaries likely reflects general CCP attitudes towards intelligence 
operations at the time of the invasion in June 1950. Further, Chen’s explanation of Mao and the 
CCP’s three-point miscalculation regarding the American diplomatic and military commitment 
to South Korea and Japan, Truman’s domestic political pressures stemming from Red China and 
the successful Soviet testing of a nuclear device, and the national security concerns over 
containing communist expansion point to a severely inexperienced, geopolitically naïve 
Communist China which failed to grasp key intelligence information within its sphere of 
international activity in June 1950. Finally, Mao’s repeated promises to provide military support 
to the DPRK, despite Soviet and North Korean collaborative withholding of invasion war 
planning, reflects the chairman’s lack of cognizance regarding the use of strategic intelligence 
information in international dealings. 
*** 
Plainly stated, when one discusses Soviet Russia’s intelligence efforts to pertaining to the 
NKA invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK), one is effectively referring to whatever 
information Josef Stalin’s preferred to receive during that period involving the Korean peninsula. 
As Christopher Andrew and Julie Elkner explain in their 2003 article, “The successes of Soviet 
intelligence collection during the early Cold War continued to be offset by Stalin’s continued 
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role as his own chief intelligence analyst and the tailoring of intelligence reports to his own 
distorted view of the West.”20 The authors continue, stating, “…in the spring of 1950,…Stalin 
made an…important error in concluding that the United States would not intervene if the North 
invaded the South…”21 Andrew and Elkner further describe how Stalin came to this conclusion 
“based on his misinterpretation of NSC-48…which excluded the Asian mainland from the U.S. 
defense perimeter,” and of which the U.S. failure “to intervene and prevent the Communist 
victory in China” provided further evidence.22 As a result of this misinterpretation, the authors 
assert, “Stalin was prepared for the first time to allow Kim Il-Sung to attack the South and begin 
the Korean War.”23 Given the authors’ argument that Stalin permitted Kim to instigate the 
Korean conflict based on his own flawed interpretation of an American intelligence document, 
one must ascribe blame for the mistake to Stalin’s faulty logic, rather than to any lack of effort 
on the Great Comrade’s part.  
Stalin also decided to allow the DPRK, which the Soviet Union provided with military 
weaponry, equipment, and embedded advisers, to invade the sovereign nation of the ROK based 
on this erroneous analysis of NSC-48, effectively greenlighting the outbreak of a war under the 
false assumption that the U.S. would not intervene. Accordingly, Stalin made a poorly calculated 
decision on the fundamental premise of an interpretative error. Stalin thus inarguably proved 
                                                         
20 Christopher Andrew, and Julie Elkner, “Stalin and Foreign Intelligence,” Totalitarian Movements & 
Political Religions 4, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 83., accessed March 10, 2017, 
http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.snhu.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=ca30c076-76e6-4888-b9a7-
925342528590%40sessionmgr120&vid=19&hid=104. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Christopher Andrew, and Julie Elkner, “Stalin and Foreign Intelligence,” Totalitarian Movements & 
Political Religions 4, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 83-4., accessed March 10, 2017, 
http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.snhu.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=ca30c076-76e6-4888-b9a7-
925342528590%40sessionmgr120&vid=19&hid=104. 
23 Ibid, 84. 
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himself (and thus his nation) extraordinarily inept in the use of intelligence during the NKA 
invasion of the ROK.  
Along this similar conceptual line, involving Stalin’s interpretive mistakes in his 
intelligence analysis which directly produce other mistakes, Raymond L. Garthoff offers, 
“Neither the general hardening of Soviet policy nor Stalin’s misjudgments in trying to blockade 
West Berlin in 1948 and unleashing the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 rested 
on professional intelligence assessments. Their foundation instead was a set of distorted 
assumptions resulting from Stalin’s application of an ideological lens in interpreting Western 
thinking and policy.”24 In this statement, Garthoff at least partially corroborates the claim from 
Andrew and Elkner that Stalin premised his decision to allow the DPRK to attack southward on a 
false assumption.25 Such closely matching assertions within the historiography indicate 
credibility for this position, and calls Stalin’s critical thinking skills in to serious question.  
In a volume of his memoirs detailing his experiences at the Kremlin during the Cold War, 
Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin’s successor as premier of the U.S.S.R., recalls, “In assessing the 
successes and failures of Kim Il Sung, I think our advisers, when they planned this operation [of 
the DPRK invasion of the ROK], probably did not take everything into account…For this, of 
course, I think Stalin is to blame.”26 Here, similar to how Goncharov and his fellow authors 
describe NKA and Soviet war planners’ failure to provide contingency directives beyond a few 
                                                         
24 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Leaders and Intelligence: Assessing the American Adversary During the 
Cold War. Georgetown University Press, 2015), 14,  http://ebookcentral.proquest.com.ezproxy.snhu.edu/lib/snhu-
ebooks/detail.action?docID=2192268. 
25 Christopher Andrew, and Julie Elkner, “Stalin and Foreign Intelligence,” Totalitarian Movements & 
Political Religions 4, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 83., accessed March 10, 2017, 
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26 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (New York: Little, Brown and 
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days after the initial invasion, Khrushchev appears to claim that Stalin’s failure to ensure that 
Soviet advisers provided NKA war planners with thorough combat guidance contributed to the 
DPRK defeat in the war.27 By failing to provide comprehensive military guidance, as 
Khrushchev describes, Stalin set the NKA up for battlefield failure, and wasted vast sums in 
rubles by providing the DPRK with massive shipments of military supplies and equipment, most 
of which U.N. forces likely destroyed following their breakout from Pusan. By proving incapable 
of transferring invaluable combat tactics and strategy to NKA officers, these Russian military 
advisers, no doubt sent to North Korea on the express orders of Stalin, suggests poor 
communication of intelligence between allied nations during the first days of the conflict.  
In a break with the theme of Stalin as a deeply flawed intelligence consumer, analyst, and 
director of collections, Thornton delivers a convincing argument regarding the Soviet leader’s 
prowess as manipulative manager of the war’s communist allies. Thornton states, “It was Stalin 
who, directly and through his representatives, determined the war plans—both the original plan 
to seize Seoul only, and the follow-on plan to seize Pusan; provided the weapons and supplies; 
trained the cadre; assigned commanders; and determined strategy and tactics, including the day 
the war would begin.”28 Thornton expounds his thoughts on Stalin, asserting, “Kim undoubtedly 
wanted to unify his country, but it was Stalin who decided whether, when, and how it would be 
attempted.”29 Thornton’s list of these accomplishments of Stalin’s entices one to believe in the 
premier’s supreme use of intelligence to manage so many things. However, when one considers 
the mutually reinforcing arguments which Andrew and Elkin make in the article, and Garthoff 
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makes in his book, both claim that Stalin makes decisions based on distorted assumptions, 
including his election to permit Kim to attack South Korea.30 Every single item in Thornton’s list 
is a decision which Stalin made- this might indicate power, but it certainly does not necessitate 
that Stalin made any of those decisions based on sound reasoning. In fact, provided one accepts 
Andrew, Elkin, and Garthoff’s argument that Stalin decided to approve Kim’s long-anticipated 
request to attack and attempt to unify the ROK under the faulty interpretation of NSC-48 that the 
U.S. would not intervene in Asia, that makes at least one major item on that list less than 
impressive. Moreover, as one reads the list, most of those decisions end in either utter defeat of 
the North Koreans, or, at best, stalemate. 
So, even when one makes a comprehensive list of all of the impactful decisions Stalin 
made independently during the initial invasion phase of the war, Stalin may prove powerful, but 
he proves anything but effective in his use of intelligence. As noted multiple times over to this 
point, Andrew, Elkin, and Garthoff combine to present a powerful argument that Stalin’s 
decision to offer his approval to Kim for his reunification efforts on the Korean peninsula rested 
on the mistaken notion that the U.S. would not intervene. Further, Khrushchev places the blame 
on Stalin for poor communication of guidance for battlefield tactics and strategy from Soviet 
military advisers to NKA officers, as Stalin doubtless ordered the advisers to Korea prior to the 
commencement of the war. Stalin was undeniably powerful, but made flawed choices and 
manipulated accurate intelligence information to fit his ideological and personal preferences. 
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Such an approach to intelligence left Stalin with distorted assumptions and lacking accurate 
information on which to base informed decisions during the NKA invasion in late June 1950. 
*** 
As emphasized at multiple points previously in this paper, one need not overexert oneself 
in the search for historians’ views which assert that the NKA invasion represents a U.S. 
intelligence failure due to both a lack of foreknowledge, as well as adequate warning of this 
offensive. In a 2016 book concentrating on the domestic political tensions President Truman 
faced before and during the Korean War, Larry Blomstedt argues that, in the period leading up to 
and in the early years of the Korean conflict, Senator Joseph “McCarthy’s quest to root out 
communist subversion in the led to wholesale purges of Far Eastern experts of the State 
Department, robbing it of valuable expertise,” and leading to the State Department’s alleged 
failure to predict the North Korean invasion.31 While this purge no doubt led to a loss of valuable 
subject matter experts pertaining to this region, Blomstedt fails to provide direct evidence that 
how the loss of this group of personnel directly led to a failure to predict the DPRK invasion in 
June 1950. 
In their 2008 book exploring the history of American intelligence, James B. Bruce and 
Roger Z. George seemingly nonchalantly state, “Spurring the evolution of intelligence analysis 
in the United States—and especially enhancing the CIA’s role as America’s premier all-source 
analytic agency—was the fallout from Communist North Korea’s surprise invasion of South 
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Korea in June 1950.”32 Perhaps the most notable point from this excerpt is that the authors refer 
to the “surprise invasion,” yet provide no citation or point of reference to support this 
perspective. This apparent scholarly acceptance of the DPRK invasion as taking U.S. intelligence 
off guard seems premature at best, especially given the persuasive points which Thornton makes 
arguing to the contrary.  
In a 2013 book covering modern presidential commitments, Marvin Kalb states that, 
“According to his biographer, Robert J. Donovan, Truman was ‘shocked’ by the news, because, 
in his judgement, this was an ‘open military attack across an accepted international boundary 
upon an American-accepted government.’”33 While Kalb at least cites another book, the 
credibility of this sources, along with Kalb’s analysis remain in question. Donovan, Truman’s 
biographer, may well accurately reflect Truman’s reaction to hearing of the invasion as 
“‘shocked,’” but Donovan clearly articulates that Truman was shocked by the DPRK audacity to 
ignore international recognition of the 38th parallel, or that the ROK was a U.S. ally. Of note, 
Donovan did not state that Truman was “‘shocked’” that the attack itself had occurred. Further, 
given the implications connected with the American President’s reaction to such news, the shock 
Truman displayed in his biographer’s might well have been a well-rehearsed reaction to the 
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impending attack. As it were, Donovan’s record of Truman’s reaction mirrored the U.S. foreign 
policy reaction within the U.N. So, it would appear that this claim of Truman’s surprise at the 
DPRK invasion more likely found its origins in the U.S. foreign policy stance, with the 
conscience of the United States “shocked” to see the DPRK invasion ignore international 
precedents—it seems reasonable to conclude that Donovan recorded the Truman administration’s 
approach to the issue within the U.N., rather than the President’s genuine alarm or surprise 
regarding the attack. 
Similarly, in his 2005 Why Secret Intelligence Fails, Michael A. Turner matter-of-factly 
states, “The CIA failed to forecast the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950…,” citing 
as evidence a table of CIA “successes and failures” produced by the author himself.34 Obviously, 
that Turner references only his own subjective chart to support his claim that the NKA invasion 
constituted a U.S. intelligence failure, calls into question the credibility of his argument. Further, 
as one may recall from previous discussions, Mitchell explains that the AFSA detected and 
warned of the invasion, so Turner’s reliance on only the CIA’s performance in warning of the 
attack lacks thorough research and context.35 In short, Turner’s assertion that the CIA failed to 
adequately learn of and warn U.S. decision makers of the DPRK offensive does not necessitate 
that U.S. intelligence in general failed in this manner. In fact, Mitchell’s evidence regarding 
AFSA SIGINT intercepts reveals that U.S. intelligence did, in fact, detect and provide warning 
of this offensive. Turner’s sole reliance on CIA records offers yet another cautionary note that 
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studying the CIA alone does not reflect the full context of the intelligence history surrounding 
the Korean conflict. 
In another example of a historian basing his or her arguments solely on CIA records 
when asserting that the DPRK invasion represents a U.S. intelligence failure, Eric Dahl states 
bluntly that, “The attack by North Korea against South Korea on June 25, 1950, came as an utter 
shock to most American policymakers, military commanders, and intelligence agencies.”36 Dahl 
claims that during the period immediately preceding the invasion, “…there was little concern 
about the threat from the clearly inferior North Korean military…,” citing a CIA article as 
stating, “‘No one in the US Government seemed worried about Korea.’”37 Time and again 
drawing from CIA reporting, Dahl appears to concur with Richard Mobley’s contention that 
“…the lack of clear, tactical indications of the North’s preparations for attack showed that the 
primary failure lay in terms of intelligence collection,” and Mobley’s statement that, “‘Even had 
it been packaged differently, the key [U.S.] decision makers would have wanted more 
compelling evidence that an attack was imminent instead of just possible.’”38 However, as 
Kathryn Weathersby directly asserts, “…it had been obvious for at least a year that war would 
break out in Korea,” and the U.S. intelligence discovery of at least 65 T-34 tanks lent that 
argument very tangible and threatening evidence of an imminent attack.39 Dahl’s near sole 
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reliance on CIA sources, and the U.S. intelligence discovery of T-34 tanks which refutes Dahl’s 
position that the intelligence provided to U.S. officials did not adequately indicate an imminent 
threat of a North Korean invasion, combine to undermine Dahl’s general assertion that the 
DPRK invasion served as an “utter shock” to most of America’s policymakers and intelligence 
agencies. The true shock, it seems, is that historians continue to make such presumptive claims 
concerning the North Korean initial invasion, despite the substantial body of compelling 
evidence arguing to the contrary. 
As Thornton so forcefully argues, formal acceptance of War Plan SL-17 (perhaps as 
much an intelligence assessment as a war plan), the U.S. intelligence discovery of large 
shipments of tanks from Russia to North Korea, a training exercise to combat a tank-led assault, 
and an Army-wide test the day before the actual North Korean invasion designed to prepare for 
an emergency all strongly suggest that U.S. intelligence detected and warned policymakers of the 
impending North Korean invasion, and that war planners were preparing accordingly on June 25, 
1950. Despite that even Mitchell acknowledges that prior to U.S. troop deployment on the 
peninsula, “The Army Security Agency did pick up a couple of interesting developments— the 
Soviet listening post in Vladivostok was targeting South Korean communications and the 
Russians were sending large amounts of medical supplies to North Korea and Manchuria — but 
that was about it. It was all quiet on the communications front,” Thornton and Weathersby’s 
assertions strongly point to U.S. intelligence having detected and made decisionmakers aware of 
the imminent DPRK invasion. 
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*** 
While ultimately a subjective exercise, comparing these four nations’ effectiveness in 
their respective use of intelligence surrounding the DPRK invasion into the ROK nonetheless 
offers evidence for logical conclusions and further debate. The least debatable portion of this 
comparison seems to lie in the notion that Kim Il Sung and his DPRK fared the worst in using 
information of strategic value to its advantage at this opening juncture of the conflict. Even in the 
one positive intelligence-based action attributed to North Korea relative to this invasion—that 
Kim achieved tactical surprise in deciding to attack on June 25, 1950—the NKA, along with the 
Soviets and the rest of the world, quickly learned that the true surprise lay in the swift, decisive 
American response, both militarily and diplomatically, in support of its South Korean allies.40 
This aspect, along with the DPRK acquiescence to Soviet military planning, command, and 
control in war plans which neglected to include contingencies for U.S. intervention or even plans 
beyond a few weeks, appears to leave North Korea as fourth most effective among this group in 
terms of intelligence use during the invasion.41 However, it seems that Mao and the Chinese 
found a way to set the bar even lower than the North Koreans regarding the mishandling of 
strategic information. 
That Mao committed the CCP to provide an unquantified amount of military support 
towards an unspecified military endeavor (due mainly to North Korea and Soviet Russia 
withholding war plans for the invasion of South Korea from him, but also due to Mao’s 
negligence in conducting intelligence operations to fill these informational gaps) constitutes 
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perhaps the most significant strategic blunder and woeful ignorance of intelligence of the war, let 
alone the initial invasion.42 Committing so blindly fundamentally contradicts any reasonable 
definition of the effective use of intelligence, and thus, the Chinese actually seem to claim fourth, 
while the North Koreans rank third in their effective leveraging of intelligence in decisions 
surrounding the DPRK invasion. 
With the final comparison remaining between the U.S. and Soviet Russia regarding 
which country more effectively used intelligence in its role during the initial NKA invasion, the 
most important factor seems to involve under what basic premise each nation operated its 
intelligence apparatus during this period. As Andrew and Elkin in their article, and Garthoff in 
his book, explain, Stalin based his strategic decisions of the era on distorted assumptions of the 
West, rather than on professional intelligence assumptions.43 On the other hand, even at its 
alleged worst, U.S intelligence proved wanting in not providing policymakers with “…more 
compelling evidence that an attack was imminent instead of just possible.”44 When it comes 
down to deciding which was more effective, Stalin’s delusions or more compelling evidence of 
the imminence versus the potential for an attack, it seems more than reasonable that the latter 
proves superior.  
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So, in using available, relevant evidence within Korean War historiography to conduct a 
comparative analysis of these four nations’ effectiveness using intelligence in their respective 
roles surrounding the initial North Korean invasion, U.S. intelligence clearly proves the most 
effective. This conclusion, coupled with a separate, though equally compelling set of arguments 
from Thornton contending against U.S. “intelligence failures” involving this DPRK offensive, 
indicate that the U.S. committed no such “intelligence failures,” and actually proved more 
effective using intelligence than its three primary adversaries. 
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Chapter 3: The Chinese Intervention 
 
 
  Figure 2: U.S. Marines Guarding Chinese POWs, Koto-Ri, December 9, 19501 
                                                         
1 F.C. Kerr, “‘Chinese communist troops, wearing tennis sneakers, rags and American footgear, surrender 
to Charley Company, 7th Marines, south of Koto-ri,’ December 9, 1950,” Department of Defense Media, accessed 
May 19, 2017, 
http://www.dodmedia.osd.mil/DVIC_View/Still_Details.cfm?SDAN=HMSN9806779&JPGPath=/Assets/Still/1998/
Marines/HM-SN-98-06779.JPG. PLA troops moved into North Korea beginning in the last half of October, with the 
large-scale military intervention fully developing by the end of November 1950. The Truman administration made 
no public acknowledgement of a major China troop presence in Korea until November 10, 1950 through a resolution 
submitted at a U.N. Security Council meeting. For NSC 81/2, in which the Truman administration overtly 
acknowledges the Chinese intervention, see “‘United States Courses of Action with Respect to Korea,’ November 
14, 1950, (NSC 81/2)” The President Harry S. Truman Library, accessed May 28, 2017, 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/documents/pdfs/ci-3-5.pdf 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
One of the most notable implications of the November 1950 Chinese military 
intervention into the Korean War was that it brought three of this project’s four featured nations 
into direct involvement in the conflict, with the remaining nation, Stalin’s Soviet Russia, deeply 
influential upon, if not essentially issuing orders to, Kim and Mao. As a result, the use of 
intelligence from all these nations’ perspectives took on perhaps an even broader role than that of 
the initial DPRK invasion, and thus ample evidence appears to exist which can facilitate a 
relevant comparative analysis, using the methodology as reflected in Chapter 2. 
Beyond the admirable historical analysis and conclusions which Goncharov and his 
fellow authors present in their 1993 Uncertain Partners, the authors also include in the book an 
appendix with full translated texts of dozens of cables between Mao, Stalin, and Kim and their 
respective government representatives. These translations of primary sources provide invaluable 
insight into the interrelations between this trio of allied communist nations as the events 
surrounding the Chinese military intervention in Korea unfolded. These cables, directives, 
transcripts of speeches, etc., allow English language access into some of these leaders’ thought 
processes, policymaking, and even war strategies, within which the use of intelligence plays an 
obvious and crucial role. The Wilson Center Digital archive also provides original scans of these 
documents, along with translations and brief context. Such resources provide a surprisingly clear 
picture of the inner workings of Korean War era China, Russia, and North Korea, and indicate 
these nations’ relative dysfunction relative to the United States in terms of their collective and 
individual application of intelligence in key wartime decisions. 
*** 
Historians appear to largely concur, and the available primary evidence seems to likewise 
reflect, that Kim Il Sung and the DPRK leadership ultimately surrendered the making of war 
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strategy decisions and their implementation to Soviet (Stalin’s) control, and that as early as 
January 1950, Stalin’s plans included Chinese military intervention in the event that U.S. 
involvement in the war necessitated such reinforcements.2 Moreover, as the primary evidence 
suggests, Kim and the DPRK leaders initiated the war with their June 25, 1950 invasion across 
the 38th parallel despite lacking any clear indication from Mao or Stalin of when, how, or to what 
extent the Chinese would enter the war, nor any specifics regarding how the Soviets would 
support these efforts.3 With such glaring holes in the DPRK’s intelligence picture of the 
battlefield, even given that the Chinese and Soviets were supposed communist comrades-in-
arms, allowing one foreign power to dictate war policy (Russia), and another to bring an entire 
army onto Korean soil (China) without a clear understanding of military commitments within the 
alliance, seems to constitute a serious lapse in DPRK judgement, with grave stakes involving 
obvious military, diplomatic, and international relations, and domestic security implications. 
Goncharov et al. note that in an October 14, 1950 cable from Mao’s premier, Zhou Enlai, 
to Stalin, Zhou “…sought Stalin’s advice on how to coordinate the combat operations of the 
Chinese and [North] Korean forces.”4 The significance here is not only that Chinese and NKA 
forces lacked a formalized plan for military coordination, but at this late date—mid-October 
1950, the North Koreans had not even begun to plan for coordination with the Chinese. 
Amazingly, nearly four months into the war, Kim and his NKA generals had to that point failed 
to even address the issue of NKA coordination with the Chinese military. Further, as Goncharov 
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and his fellow authors point out, when the issue finally received attention, it was the Chinese, not 
the DPRK leadership, who asked Stalin for advice on how best to coordinate operations of the 
two armies. Kim and his generals disregarded the value of such vital wartime information, and 
this lapse in elementary military preparation appears to represent an important DPRK 
intelligence failure. 
When one examines this cable from Zhou to Stalin, Zhou’s choice of wording only 
strengthens this concept. In an English translation of the document, Zhou states, “The Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army will enter North Korea for military operations as volunteers. When it 
undertakes military operations in cooperation with the North Korean People’s Army, how should 
[the question of] the mutual command relationship be decided?”5 Here, Zhou begins by matter-
of-factly stating that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army [PLA] will enter North Korean 
sovereign territory for military operations—this clearly indicates that Kim has provided the 
Chinese with prior approval of this action, as a foreign army entering another nation’s sovereign 
territory without the permission of that nation constitutes an obvious act of war. Zhou then asks 
Stalin how the mutual command relationship between the NKA and PLA should be decided, 
indicating that no party within the three communist nations had addressed this issue prior to this 
cable. Thus, Kim agreed to the PLA entering his nation before even addressing how the 
command structure would be formed, which essentially means that during an ongoing state of 
war, two separate armies, speaking different languages and serving two distinct governments, 
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would not know who, or what government was in charge. Failing to even acknowledge that a 
coordination plan between the NKA and PLA was undeniably crucial to combat effectiveness 
exhibits a blatant disregard for information of intelligence value on the part of the DPRK 
leadership. 
Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue explain that even after Zhou opened discussions between the 
three communist nations in mid-October 1950 regarding the need for a joint NKA-PLA 
command structure in Korea, the DPRK leadership did not formalize this coordination until 
December 3, 1950, some six weeks later, and during an ongoing war.6 By that point, the Korean 
War had been raging for nearly half a year. Further, when the North Koreans finally did establish 
a joint command structure with the PLA, they ceded the command to a Chinese general, Peng 
Dehuai, despite Mao’s assurance to DPRK delegates that “‘we leave this matter in your hands.’”7 
The DPRK leadership’s decision to allow a foreign general to command its troops meant that 
NKA military intelligence answered to a foreign national, and thus that the DPRK failed to 
protect its intelligence. As the reader may recall, Bimfort’s definition of intelligence includes the 
protection of intelligence, and Peng’s appointment as commander of joint NKA-PLA forces in 
Korea meant that DPRK leadership failed to protect its intelligence from a foreign power, even if 
one considers China a loyal North Korean ally.  
Although it would likely provide a more complex and intriguing study if evidence existed 
which might point to at least a few examples of DPRK competency in its use of intelligence in 
decisions related to the Chinese military intervention, no such evidence appears to exist. As the 
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primary sources and secondary analysis cited above attest, Kim and the DPRK leadership not 
only failed to address the basic requisite for a coordination plan between the NKA and PLA 
forces, but acquiesced to the placement of a Chinese general as commander of the joint effort, 
and, in turn, failing to protect DPRK intelligence from foreign powers—allied or not. While one 
may argue that the DPRK leadership had little choice but to follow directives from their Soviet 
and Chinese “allies,” as Pantsov and Levine posit that, “Kim needed Mao’s help…” and, “It was 
impossible [for Kim] to disobey Stalin…,” Kim and his lieutenants could have established a 
command coordination plan as early as January 1950 and appointed an NKA general as joint 
command and nonetheless maintained compliance Chinese and Soviet demands.8 Further, in 
assessing the effectiveness of the DPRK’s use of intelligence in decisions surrounding the 
Chinese military intervention, explanations of coercion from external forces hold no bearing. 
Only how effectively Kim and the DPRK leadership utilized and protected intelligence involving 
the Chinese intervention may be assessed, and the historical record seems to persuasively 
indicate that they failed profoundly. 
*** 
Given that the Chinese military intervention in the Korean War inherently pertains most 
directly to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), it would seem a reasonable prediction that the 
amount and type scholarly materials available relevant to the CCP leadership’s use of 
intelligence in deciding to intervene is overwhelmingly substantial. Indeed, historians now have 
access to many pertinent primary documents, and seemingly countless texts on the general topic 
of the Chinese intervention exist. However, within the relatively narrow scope of Mao and other 
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CCP leadership’s use of intelligence, the quantity and breadth of sources likewise narrows, with 
a select group of these sources standing out as the most compelling evidence. These sources 
reveal a generally flawed approach to and the use of intelligence within the Chinese regime’s 
leadership, with Mao deeply influenced by Stalin, but undeniably holding the final word on 
China’s military decisions. 
In the appendix of Uncertain Partners, Goncharov et al. provide an English translation of 
an October 14, 1950 cable from Mao to his premier, Zhou Enlai, which outlines Mao’s 
arguments for entering the war. In this consequential correspondence, Mao states, “If we do not 
send troops [to Korea], the reactionaries at home and abroad will be swollen with arrogance 
when the enemy troops press to the Yalu River border. Consequently, it will be…unfavorable to 
Northeast China. [In such a situation], the entire Northeast Frontier Force will be tied down and 
the power supplies in South Manchuria will be controlled [by hostile parties].”9 Here, Mao 
alludes to his assessment that U.S. forces intended to invade Manchuria after pushing through 
North Korea. This assessment from Mao reflects another primary document which Goncharov 
and his fellow authors examine, an official report from Zhou on “Mao’s assessment of the 
ultimate aim of the American military operations in North Korea.”10 In the report, Zhou states, 
“Our intelligence is that [the Americans] planned first to cross the 38th parallel without 
provoking China and then to direct their spearhead at China.”11 As these authors argue and the 
primary source evidence sources reflect, “Convinced by intelligence assessments, ideology, a 
history of conflict, and the statements of some U.S. commanders that the UN juggernaut would 
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not halt at the Yalu, Mao believed that a confrontation with the United States was inescapable, 
and that it would be better to enter the war before Kim Il Sung retreated into China with his 
government in exile.”12 With all of this evidence persuasively indicating that Mao and the CCP 
leadership based their decision to intervene in Korea at least partially on Chinese intelligence 
assessments, what remains to determine is whether PRC intelligence accurately assessed 
American military intentions to invade China.   
The most direct and clear evidence of American intentions in the Korean War are laid out 
in NSC 81/1, a top secret U.S. National Security Council intelligence assessment and analysis of 
potential courses of action pertaining to the conflict as of it date of publication, September 9, 
1950. The conflict was nearly three months in duration at that juncture, and less than a week 
following the publication of NSC 81/1, MacArthur conducted the Inchon landing on September 
15. This moment was also a little over one month prior to Mao’s final decision to send PLA 
troops into Korea, and it seems that it was at this time and through this particular document that 
one might best determine whether American intentions in its prosecution of the war included an 
invasion of China. Moreover, with its top secret classification level, it seems safe to assume that 
the analysis and possible courses of action presented in the document are genuine and void of 
any inhibitions that foreign powers might learn of them. 
Paragraph 18 of the “Conclusions” section of NSC 81/1 states begins with, “In the event 
of the open or covert employment of major Communist Chinese forces south of the 38th 
parallel:”, continues with “a. The United States should not permit itself to become engaged in 
general war with Communist China,” and adds “b. As long as action by U.N. military forces 
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offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance, the U.N. commander should continue such 
action and be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea against 
Communist China.”13 The first note here is that the document clearly establishes that such action 
is contingent upon not only the deployment of “major” PLA forces, but these forces conduct 
operations south of the 38th parallel. So, without this important development south of the 
established north-south international boundary, the U.S. harbored no intentions of even engaging 
PLA forces, let alone invading Manchuria.  
Second, before detailing how the U.N. commander should prosecute the war in the event 
of major PLA forces operating south of the 38th parallel, the document plainly states that the U.S. 
should not engage in general war with China, a situation which would undoubtedly exist should 
the U.S. invade China. Lastly, although NSC 81/1 states that the U.N. commander should be 
afforded authorization to conduct naval and air strikes “outside of Korea”, the conspicuous 
omission of land-based attacks indicates that no ground invasion of any nation—to include, of 
course, China—should receive authorization.  Given all of these points, gleaned from the 
document which likely presents the most candid portrayal of American intentions in its 
participation in the Korean conflict, it cannot be reasonably argued that the U.S. intended to 
invade the PRC at the time of the Chinese intervention. Thus, Mao’s assessment that the U.S. 
intended to invade his nation, which informed his subsequent decision to send PLA troops into 
Korea, appears to represent a deeply flawed Chinese use of intelligence in making such a 
consequential wartime decision.  
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This conclusion regarding Mao and the CCP leadership’s misinterpretation of intelligence 
falls in line with the views of a renowned scholar with the historiography of the Korean War, 
Michael Sheng. In a 2014 article, Sheng breaks down the evolution of the historiography 
pertaining to the conflict, while also offering a revisionist approach to the subject matter, 
particularly surrounding Mao. Sheng explains, “For analytical purposes, the existing scholarship 
may be divided into two schools of interpretation, one that emphasizes ‘national interest’ and one 
that emphasizes ‘ideology.’”14 Within the national interest school, some scholars such as Allen S. 
Whiting, Sheng asserts, “have portrayed Mao Zedong as a reluctant participant in the Korean 
War,” while others such as Goncharov et al. and Weathersby “further argue that Mao was 
somehow manipulated or forced to send troops by the fait accompli presented by Stalin and Kim 
Il-sung…”15 Still others, notably Thornton, “even speculate that, in order to prevent Mao from 
becoming the ‘Tito of the East...,’ Stalin created the crisis at China’s doorstep to draw Beijing 
into a conﬂict with the United States.”16 Even if one accepts any, part, or all of these national 
interest perspectives, these arguments fail to excuse the CCP chairman’s decision to enter the 
war based on flawed interpretations of intelligence concluding that the U.S. aimed to invade 
mainland China via the Korean peninsula. Regardless of his own indifference, or external 
manipulation from the Soviets and North Koreans, Mao made the decision to send PLA troops to 
Korea based on poor predictive intelligence analysis, and thus he and his fellow Chinese 
communist leaders should bare the culpability without caveat.  
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As an explanation of the “ideology” approach to Mao’s role in the Korean War, Sheng 
offers that scholars representing views of this school, “While acknowledging Mao’s reluctance to 
intervene, they emphasize the inner logic of Mao’s ‘continuing revolution,’ including communist 
internationalist ideology and national security concerns.”17 Sheng continues with his explanation 
of historians who take an “ideology” approach to Mao, stating, “Beijing, they argue, viewed 
China’s national interest via a Leninist prism, which led Mao and his associates in Moscow and 
Pyongyang to believe that war with the US imperialists was inevitable.”18 Similar to the national 
interest approach, the ideology approach  attempts to define Mao’s motivations for entering the 
war, and while communist ideology may have heavily influenced Mao and CCP leadership in 
this decision, it is just that—ideology, not intelligence. It appears that in allowing ideological 
communist dogma to skew their analysis of American intentions in east Asia, the CCP, and 
especially Mao, confused theory with fact-based estimates. Effective use of intelligence, of 
course, may include the former, but when it involves entering into a major regional war against 
the most powerful military on earth at the time, the decision to do so must reflect the latter. As 
Gaddis puts it, “…ideology distorted reality. Mao, from 1946 on, was so convinced of the 
Americans’ ill will, he ‘tilted’ toward Moscow to protect his revolution from a plot to throttle it 
that never existed.”19 Such arguments from the ideology school reveal that Mao allowed 
ideology to trump reality, a scenario wherein Mao forced the fate of the PLA troops he 
dispatched to Korea to rely on “ideological euphoria—a conviction that the forces of history was 
on [the communist forces’] side—” rather than on viable intelligence.20  
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Telegrams between Mao and his subordinates in the period immediately prior to Mao’s 
mid-October 1950 decision to intervene in Korea reveal that Mao did not come to this decision 
for lack of detailed intelligence regarding U.N. troop strength, positions, and movement. In a 
telegram from Mao to Zhou on October 14, Mao details such intelligence involving U.S., ROK, 
and British units throughout the Korean peninsula, and their relative strength relative to NKA 
forces.21 Mao also includes a battlefield assessment from General Peng that, “…if [the Chinese 
communist] army can dispatch one corps to the mountainous areas in Tokchon County about 200 
kilometers northeast of Pyongyang and deploy three other corps and three artillery divisions to 
the Huichon-Chonchon-Kanggye area north of Tokchon,” the PLA forces might halt a U.S. 
advance on Pyongyang, “gain time to become well equipped and trained,” and “annihilate” ROK 
“puppet” units advancing north from Wonsan.22 With such a clear intelligence picture of the 
battlefield, reflecting a CCP understanding of both adversarial and friendly forces, as well as 
potential outcomes from PLA troop deployments, it would prove difficult to argue that Mao and 
his leadership associates chose to enter the war on the basis of a general lack of, or deficiently 
detailed, intelligence on the battlefield situation.  
Yet, Mitchell argues that, “Because of their different language and appearance, as well as 
a lack of technology, the Chinese apparently did not make a major intelligence effort. Confident 
in their military philosophy and cultural superiority, the Chinese concentrated on hammering at 
the enemy, while largely ignoring the mass of American radio transmissions.”23 Despite 
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Mitchell’s contention that the Chinese placed little emphasis on the collection or use of 
intelligence throughout the Korean War, evidence from primary sources such as the October 14 
telegram from Mao to Zhou indicate that at a strategic level, the CCP leadership both valued and 
enjoyed ready access to accurate intelligence. The key delineation between Mitchell’s assertions 
and those revealed in the primary documents, it seems, lies in the Chinese valuation on such 
information at the strategic versus the tactical level. While the PLA battlefield units might well 
have largely dismissed the use of intelligence at the tactical level where the actual fighting 
occurred, the communications between Mao and his close leadership associates such as Premier 
Zhou and General Peng suggest that the CCP leadership incorporated intelligence from the 
Korean combat theater, at least that pertaining to units of division-level or higher, in their 
ongoing strategy for the war. Moreover, given that these telegrams show that Mao and such CCP 
leaders had access to this type of intelligence, Chinese intelligence must have conducted ongoing 
intelligence collection efforts at the division level or higher.  
As the intercommunications between the CCP leadership reveal, Mao’s decision to 
intervene in Korea did not result from a lack in collection, accuracy, or CCP leadership valuation 
of available intelligence. In other words, the decision to intervene was not based on flawed 
intelligence collection or dissemination, at either the tactical or strategic level. Rather, it seems, 
Mao chose to send PLA forces across the Yalu River as a result of the chairman’s ideologically-
influenced, flawed interpretation of available intelligence regarding U.S. strategic intentions in 
east Asia.  
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An examination of available historical documents forcefully indicates that Mao’s 
decision to intervene militarily in Korea represents a significant Chinese intelligence failure, and 
that Mao bares the ultimate culpability for this mistake. Mao’s own communications to Peng and 
Zhou reveal that the chairman interpreted available intelligence as evidence of American 
strategic intentions to invade China via the Korean peninsula. This conclusion from Mao proves 
readily discredited when one considers that NSC 81/1, published only weeks before Mao’s final 
commitment to intervention and outlining U.S. strategy for Korea, overtly forbids the U.N. 
commander from engaging in “major” war with Communist China, and implicitly excludes the 
use of ground forces outside of Korea—to include, of course, China—directly refutes any notion 
that the U.S. aimed to invade China. Further, Mao’s October 14, 1950 telegram to Peng, sent just 
days before Mao ordered troops to Korea, shows that the Chinese leadership maintained an 
accurate intelligence picture of the Korean theater, detailing both adversarial and NKA unit 
activity across the peninsula, and thus that one cannot explain Mao’s faulty interpretation of U.S. 
intentions on a lack of available intelligence. To the contrary, it appears that despite possessing a 
reasonably accurate intelligence picture of the battlefield, Mao’s proscription to Leninist 
ideology, or even aspirations to present himself as the “‘Lenin of the East,’” as Sheng argues, 
heavily influenced his calculus of American intentions and skewed his analysis of strategic 
intelligence.24 This flawed analysis directly informed Mao’s decision to deploy PLA forces to 
Korea, and engage in a conflict wherein nearly a million of his Chinese countrymen would perish 
.*** 
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The Soviet role in the Chinese military intervention in October and November of 1950 
aligns with the part Russia played throughout the conflict—one of direction, support, and 
manipulation. In all of these facets of the Russia’s involvement, of course, Stalin proved the most 
influential and often deciding factor, as the Soviet leader maintained ultimate control over not 
only his own nation’s wartime activities, but his communist North Korean and Chinese allies as 
well. As the reader may recall, Andrew and Elkner assert that despite a very capable Soviet 
foreign intelligence apparatus during the Cold War, Stalin’s self-imposed role as chief Russian 
intelligence analyst, his tendency to slant the intelligence he received to fit his own “distorted 
view of the West,” often undermined sound decision making within the Soviet government.25 
Moreover, the fear Stalin inspired amongst even his own intelligence agencies led some Russian 
intelligence personnel to withhold information which might conflict with the dictator’s 
preconceived notions, undoubtedly crippling Soviet intelligence dissemination capability.26 
Perhaps even more significantly, such omissions of information surrounding national security 
issues doubtless skewed Stalin’s understanding of reality, even as he made every major decision 
pertaining to Russia, including its involvement in China’s troop deployment into Korea. 
According to Bimfort, intelligence includes the protection and assurance of non-
disclosure of national security information, a discipline to which Stalin appears to have adhered 
in his relations with his Korean War communist allies, and especially when communicating with 
Kim and Mao directly about the Chinese intervention. Pantsov and Levine provide a 
chronological account of how Stalin manipulated his fellow communist leaders through his 
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calculated control of information pertaining to the Chinese military support of the DPRK. 
Pantsov and Levine state that in Mao’s initial commitments of Chinese support to North Korea, 
which he declared on two separate occasions—first in January, then in May 1950— “Just like 
Kim Il Sung…Mao miscalculated. Stalin alone came out a winner.”27 As the authors explain, 
although Kim initiated the war through the NKA invasion, and Mao “had unequivocally 
promised his neighbors [North Korea] help…,” as early as the summer of 1949, Stalin’s 
dominant position of power among the three communist leaders allowed him to dictate much of 
the flow of information within the alliance, apparently leaving Mao and Kim dependent on him 
for informed guidance.28 Stalin’s careful control over when, how, and to what extent he released 
information to these allies regarding the communist alliance’s military plans indicates a potential 
example of a highly effective use of intelligence.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Stalin managed to receive Mao’s commitment of military 
support to the DPRK, despite no indication from the Soviet leader as to what circumstances this 
support might be required. Having secured this support, in late March, the diary of the Soviet 
ambassador to China reveals that Stalin informed Kim that in “‘…the case of emergency, the 
[Chinese] will send troops,’” and gave the DPRK his de facto blessing to invade the south, 
provided the North Koreans conducted “‘considerable preparation.’”29 Stalin, as we shall see, 
disingenuously informed Kim, “‘We must be absolutely certain that Washington will not get 
involved in the fight.’”30 Another translation of a primary source document shows that it was not 
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until mid-May that Stalin informed Mao, via telegram, of his prior meeting with Kim, and of the 
Soviet contingent approval for a DPRK military incursion into the south.31 Stalin added that, “In 
this regard a qualification was made, that the question [of whether the NKA should invade the 
ROK] should be decided finally by the Chinese and Korean comrades together…”32 Stalin made 
no mention to Mao of the cautionary caveat regarding American involvement in the war, as he 
had with Kim. To this point in mid-May 1950, one might argue that Stalin had deviously 
manipulated his two supposed allies, capitalizing on Kim’s eagerness to reunify Korea, and 
obtained Mao’s uninformed, seemingly unqualified commitment to provide the DPRK with 
military support. Telling Kim to beware American entry into the war, while remaining silent on 
this matter in his correspondence with Mao, and leaving the decision for war up to Mao and Kim 
under the pretense of a genuinely cooperative alliance, Stalin appears to have set the stage for 
what Pantsov and Levine argue were “…Stalin’s true geopolitical intentions. For the sake of 
world revolution he was ready to provoke World War III.”33 However, Stalin proved either 
unaware or dismissive of other critical developments which emerged as a result of this scheming. 
Unbeknownst to Stalin, or perhaps known, yet perceived as an unproblematic issue to the 
Soviet leader, prior to Stalin acknowledging it, Mao was not only aware of the meeting between 
Stalin and Kim in March 1950, but had “…long since understood Stalin’s intentions to start a 
war in Korea, but he still resented Stalin’s failure to level with him in January.”34 Contrary to his 
promise to Stalin “…to not reveal the [invasion] plan…whether to the ‘Chinese comrades’ or 
even to the other North Korean leaders,” immediately following the March meeting, Kim 
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dispatched emissaries to Beijing in order to inform the CCP leadership of the planned invasion.35 
In his attempts to manipulate his so-called allies through his selective release of information, 
Stalin apparently failed to account for their own potential duplicitous actions. Kim’s dispatch of 
North Korean emissaries to China thwarted Stalin’s intended objective to withhold from Mao the 
Soviet-DPRK plans for an invasion constitutes a Russian failure to protect secret, strategic- level 
intelligence information from a foreign power. Further, it seems that Stalin failed to apply a basic 
cost-benefit calculus to the potential outcomes of this policy of secrecy within the alliance. Mao 
resented his exclusion from such consequential invasion plans, undoubtedly influencing the 
chairman’s October 2 message to Stalin in which Mao announced that China would “refrain from 
advancing troops” into Korea. In combination with his growing realization that U.S. forces might 
prove a devastating adversary in Korea, the resentment Mao harbored regarding Stalin’s lack of 
transparence no doubt influenced his postponement of troop deployment. 
Additionally, it seems reasonable to assume that Kim realized, given Stalin’s obvious 
record of secrecy towards Mao, that Stalin likely would, if he had not already, keep similarly 
impactful information from Kim. The resulting mistrust within the communist alliance 
jeopardized the implementation of Stalin’s strategy which relied pivotally upon Chinese forces to 
confront and halt the American advance northward. At the root of this miscalculation is Stalin’s 
failure to effectively apply predictive analysis to realistic, hypothetical scenarios to his decision 
to maintain secrets from his allies. In short, Stalin failed to both protect this secret, as well as to 
consider the implications to his war plans should Mao discover this secret. 
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Mao’s October 2, 1950 proposal to postpone PLA troop deployment to Korea prompted a 
coded telegram response from Stalin which receives considerable attention within the 
historiography due to Stalin’s theretofore unseen candidness with Mao regarding the situation in 
Korea.36 In the telegram, Stalin states, “‘Of course I took into account…[the possibility] that the 
USA, despite its unreadinesss for a big war,…which, in turn, would drag China into the war, and 
along with this draw into the war the USSR. Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not, 
because together we will be stronger than the USA and England…’”37 Stalin goes on to assert 
that, “‘If a war is inevitable, let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese 
militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a ready-
made bridgehead on the continent in a form of the entire Korea run by [ROK leader] Synghman 
Rhee.’”38 While historians differ in their interpretations of this telegram along “national interest” 
and “ideology” lines, what is clear is that Stalin “now bluntly explained that an open clash 
between China and America was precisely what he was aiming for.”39 That Stalin only at this 
late stage in the war, weeks after MacArthur’s September 15, 1950 landing at Inchon and over 
five months after the initial NKA invasion, attests to a lack of crucial communication between 
Stalin and Mao regarding the most basic, foundational reasons for Stalin’s involvement in the 
war.  
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Moreover, Stalin clearly articulates his continued paranoia pertaining to a Japanese 
military threat to Soviet Russia and China, a fear which ignored or lacked the intelligence insight 
into the severe restrictions on Japanese military capabilities which the U.S. implemented 
following WWII. Stalin’s lack of communication with Mao regarding such a basic motivation 
and strategic understanding for the Sino-Soviet alliance for propagating a war in Korea—that the 
U.S. would intervene—represents a lack of crucial intelligence sharing on the part of the Soviets, 
especially given the heavy military burden Stalin placed on the Chinese. And Stalin’s expressed 
fear of a continued Japanese military threat displays either a lack of Soviet intelligence regarding 
the U.S. restrictions on Japanese military capabilities in the aftermath of WWII, or poor analysis 
of available analysis thereof. When one considers that this October 2, 1950 telegram from Stalin 
represents a rare glimpse of the Soviet leader’s candid views regarding the conflict in Korea, and 
that the message outlines Stalin’s general motivations for both the Soviets and Chinese entering 
the war, these intelligence failures take on a remarkably profound context. 
Stalin’s use of secrecy amongst the communist alliance engaged in the Korean War 
proved an ineffective use of information of intelligence value, first, as Stalin not only failed to 
keep these secrets, as evidenced in the example of Mao learning of the secret meeting in March 
1950 between Stalin and Kim wherein Stalin greenlit the NKA invasion. Second, in keeping 
secrets from Mao, Stalin doubtless fostered Mao’s resentment for excluding the chairman from 
decisions which involved Chinese military commitments, and likely left Kim wondering what 
information Stalin had already withheld or would withhold from him. The resulting mistrust 
could not have outweighed the potential benefits of leaving Mao or Kim in the dark on 
communist plans in Korea. This leads to the third conclusion on Stalin’s use of intelligence 
involving the Chinese intervention: it was not only ultimately ineffective, but likely unnecessary 
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for Stalin to withhold plans for the NKA invasion from Mao. Although Mao wavered in early 
October 1950 in his commitment to send troops to Korea, he had also clearly expressed that he 
believed the Americans’ true intentions for their involvement in Korea was to use the peninsula 
as a base of invasion into China.40 Mao may have held out in the hopes of securing Stalin’s 
commitment of air support to PLA operations in Korea, but Mao’s prior promises to send troops 
and his fear of American invasion strongly suggest that he planned to send troops to the 
peninsula regardless of this air cover.41  
Fourth, and lastly, Stalin’s fear of a Japanese military threat points to either a lack of 
intelligence, or poor analysis of available intelligence regarding the severe restrictions imposed 
on the Japanese military following WWII. Along with his belief, which Mao shared, that the U.S. 
intended to invade mainland Asia via Korea, Stalin’s unrealistic assessment that in 1950 Japan 
posed a viable threat to either Russia or China appears absurd. That Stalin included this in his 
most candid to-date communication to Mao regarding his reasons and understanding of the war 
highlights the Soviet leaders’, and thus Russia’s, poor use of intelligence directly pertaining to 
the Chinese intervention into the conflict. 
*** 
As discussed previously, historians within the consensus view regarding the Chinese 
intervention into Korea in October to November 1950 argue that this deployment of PLA troops 
into China represents a U.S. intelligence failure, as due to a lack of intelligence warning of this 
development, when the intervention actually occurred, it shocked U.S. policymakers and high-
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level military officers. Several prominent themes emerge from the within these arguments, 
including that these historians almost exclusively reference CIA intelligence estimates in their 
accusations of American intelligence failure, neglecting to include relative estimates from other 
U.S. intelligence agencies and sources. Another argument from within the consensus contends 
that, at the opening and first stages of the Korean War, the U.S. intelligence apparatus suffered 
from severe administrative dysfunction and capability atrophy following the post-WWII draw-
down in forces, and thus offered poor warning of the Chinese intentions to enter the war. Still 
another prominent argument focuses not on poor U.S. collection or dissemination of intelligence, 
but a lack of receptivity within top U.S. administration and military circles to the intelligence 
which clearly indicated an imminent Chinese military intervention.42 While all of these 
approaches to the Chinese deployment of troops to Korea present persuasive arguments, a careful 
examination of available primary sources, an exploration of some provocative assertions from 
Thornton, and a logic-based analysis of the available historical evidence indicates that the U.S. 
collected, disseminated, analyzed, and interpreted intelligence effectively and acted upon it 
according to American strategic objectives as laid out in NSC 68 and NSC 81/1. 
Finding references to CIA estimates which reflect the agency’s failure to accurately 
assess Chinese intentions in the late fall of 1950 proves a relatively effortless task. As Erik Dahl 
notes, “The CIA warned soon after the war had begun in June [1950] that Chinese forces could 
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become involved. But though on the one hand the CIA was providing worrisome tactical 
reporting—such as that Chinese units composed of ethnic Korean soldiers appeared to be 
prepared to become involved—on the other hand it was providing more reassuring strategic 
analysis that there were no indications that the Soviets intended to have China intervene.”43 Dahl 
continues, stating, “As an article in the CIA in-house journal notes, this type of balancing act 
‘became the preferred art form for most Agency reporting through late November [1950].’’’44 
Many other historians, including Major Justin Haynes, Michael Turner, and Jian Chen, note this 
pattern of CIA accuracy in collecting and reporting on current Chinese troop buildup along the 
Korean border, while downplaying the likelihood of a major PLA intervention.45 Indeed, when 
one examines the CIA estimates from this period in the late fall of 1950, these historians’ 
arguments appear credible, as the documents identify the Chinese threat and capability to enter 
Korea, but fail to commit to a prediction that a major PLA intervention is imminent. As Burton 
Ira Kaufman points out, even when the CIA finally “…determined in October that the Chinese 
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would enter the war,” the assessment stated that this incursion would serve “…only for the 
purpose of defending [Chinese] power stations along the Yalu.”46 Given this evidence, it appears 
that if one examines only CIA estimates from this period immediately prior to the Chinese 
intervention in late October to early November 1950, one is left to conclude that the CIA, at 
least, intelligence in its predictive analysis of Chinese intentions in fall of 1950. 
However, as covered in Chapter 1, Mitchell points out that as early as July 1950, six 
months before the Chinese intervention, the U.S. AFSA successfully intercepted multiple 
communications from which one could only extrapolate that a major Chinese offensive into 
Korea was imminent.47 That the AFSA did collect and report these intercepts is beyond dispute. 
What remains to explore here is whether U.S. analysts incorporated this intelligence into an 
accurate predictive analysis, made recommendations to U.S. leadership based on this 
intelligence, and whether these policymakers acted accordingly. 
As background, Thornton points out that as president, Truman oversaw the creation of 
both the CIA and National Security Agency (NSA), the federal agency primarily tasked with 
SIGINT intelligence collection and analysis related to national security.48 Thornton also notes 
that Truman “…never mentioned the existence of the NSA,…or any of its predecessors, and his 
biographers have shown ‘a similar disinclination to dwell on’ sensitive intelligence issues.”49 
Given this inhibition to discuss matters involving intelligence, it seems unsurprising the manner 
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in which Truman chose to explain, at least publicly, the apparent U.S. unpreparedness for both 
the NKA invasion and Chinese intervention. Thornton explains that, “Truman could not say that 
SIGINT did not exist, yet to acknowledge its existence would imply advance knowledge that the 
war was coming and raise questions regarding the failure to take preventive action.”50 So, in the 
case of the NKA invasion, Truman argued that, “…America’s intelligence capability had 
atrophied and Korea moreover had not been identified as a prime collection target.”51 Thornton 
continues, stating, “The [Truman] administration could not also argue ‘intelligence failure’ once 
the war began,” but that, “Incredibly…the Truman administration did make the same argument 
with regard to Chinese intervention that it made with regard to the North Korean attack, even 
though a massive Chinese troop presence was undeniable in October [1950].”52 Thornton’s point 
stands to logic—if one believes the still questionable assertion from Truman that the U.S. 
intelligence capabilities had atrophied following WWII, and that Korea was not a prime 
collection target, the same explanation could not be reasonably asserted four months later when 
the Chinese intervened in Korea, and over a month after the U.S. had conducted the major 
landing at Inchon in mid-September.  
Mitchell’s revelation of AFSA intercepts indicating a Chinese intervention as early as 
July 1950, along with Thornton’s points regarding Truman’s reluctance to discuss sensitive 
intelligence matters and the improbability of U.S. leadership, to include Truman, remaining 
unaware of the impending Chinese intervention, prove persuasive counterpoints to the CIA 
estimates of the period. Without delving into conspiracy concepts, such points call into question 
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the accuracy of the CIA assessments which identified the presence of substantial PLA forces 
near and within Korea, yet consistently downplayed the threat of a full-scale intervention. Of 
course, if intelligence existed which clearly indicated the impending intervention, which Mitchell 
shows it did, and Truman and his administration were aware of the imminent intervention, which 
Thornton argues compellingly that they were, then the question remains: Why did Truman deny 
foreknowledge of the Chinese military intervention in Korea? 
In an effort to answer this question, it appears necessary to first address the seemingly 
unrelated issues expressed in some historians’ consensus views that the U.S. intelligence 
apparatus suffered from general dysfunction, and that a lack of receptivity to the notion of a 
widescale Chinese intervention existed amongst U.S. policymakers just prior to, and in the first 
stages of, the Korean conflict.  
In his book involving what he alleges as the U.S. intelligence failure to accurately assess 
and warn U.S. leadership of the imminent Chinese military entry into the Korean War, Justin 
Haynes posits that MacArthur’s chief intelligence officer Maj. Gen. “Willoughby and the Central 
Intelligence Agency accurately identified China’s rapid build-up of combat forces and related 
infrastructure in Manchuria from July through early October, yet they struggled to identify the 
Chinese intentions.”53 This statement aligns with the consensus view which argues that up to 
October 8, 1950, the CIA accurately identified the threat of a Chinese incursion into Korea, yet 
consistently assessed that a full-scale PLA intervention was unlikely. Here, Haynes argues that 
MacArthur’s intelligence reflected this same pattern of assessment. Haynes asserts that the root 
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of Willoughby’s analytical mistakes lay in the general’s “personal control over intelligence 
reporting and analysis” which “significantly limited independent analysis and competing 
hypotheses.”54 Further, Haynes argues, Willoughby and his analysts “…frequently fell victim to 
mirror imaging in misidentifying the Chinese decisive point for entering the war,” defining 
mirror imaging as “…a concept wherein analysts inadvertently base their assessments on how 
the analysts themselves would act as opposed to taking the point of view of the enemy.”55 While 
Haynes offers compelling arguments regarding possible dysfunction within and between 
Willoughby’s G2 section and the CIA, Thornton, as we shall see, these positions with primary 
source evidence and arguments of his own, within which one might begin to understand the 
alleged ineptitude of both MacArthur’s intelligence section and the CIA, as well as Truman’s 
motivations for declining to publicly acknowledge his prior awareness of the imminent Chinese 
intervention. 
The other issue many historians arguing from the topic’s consensus perspective present 
involves a relative unreceptiveness within U.S. military and policymaking circles to intelligence 
assessment indicating an inevitable, full-scale Chinese intervention on the Korean peninsula. As 
Erik Dahl states, “The intervention of Chinese troops into the conflict in Korea in the fall of 1950 
presented a second great shock to American leaders and intelligence officials, and it has been 
seen by historians as an even more puzzling intelligence failure.”56 Dahl notes that historians 
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such as Richard Betts explain the cause of this supposed shock, stating, “…the bulk of the blame 
lies with American policymakers and senior military officials, who through a ‘mix of hubris, 
wishfulness, and miscalculation’ did not believe that China would invade and refused to accept 
the warnings they received.”57 Dahl himself explains, “Here the crucial factor missing was 
receptivity to the intelligence on the part of decision makers. The intelligence should have been 
actionable given its specificity, but the crucial ingredient of receptivity was lacking.”58 So, if one 
ascribes to Dahl’s arguments, despite specific and overwhelming evidence, gleaned through not 
only U.S., but even British intelligence, that the Chinese intervention would occur, factors within 
the U.S. civilian and military leadership such as ego, wishful thinking, and misinterpretation 
trumped the stark reality of hundreds of thousands of PLA troops massing on the Korean 
border.59 However, with such profound implications at stake in a possible Chinese intervention 
into Korea, this seems an unlikely explanation for the U.S. leadership’s lack of receptiveness to 
the undeniable presence of large deployments of Chinese troops near and within Korea. 
With the backdrop of Truman’s hesitation to discuss any sensitive intelligence matters, 
specifically the NSA or U.S. SIGINT capabilities, Thornton explains, “There were at least two 
and possibly three instances in October and November when Truman could have settled for 
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substantially more than the status quo ante bellum, leaving South Korea the victor and North 
Korea perhaps terminally weakened…but he declined.”60 Before detailing his specific arguments 
regarding these three junctures involving the Chinese military intervention in October to 
November 1950, Thornton prefaces these points with “…the assumption that the huge 
deployment of troops to border crossing points, the growing volume of communication between 
Beijing and its forces as well as the signals intercepts of those communications, clearly revealed 
Beijing’s preparations to intervene.” In other terms, Thornton logically assumes that all of these 
factors would allow U.S. intelligence, especially SIGINT assets, to detect the imminent PLA 
troop deployment into Korea, and warn the U.S. leadership accordingly. 
The three junctures which Truman references represent moments at which Truman might 
have sought settlement with the DPRK and CCP and gained a position more advantageous than 
the pre-war situation (north of the 38th parallel).61 However, as Thornton notes, at all three 
junctures, Truman chose to continue fighting and even push north, and “…the nature of Chinese 
Communist involvement was a response to advances by U.N. forces into prepared positions 
occupied by Chinese forces.”62 The implication here is that in order to occupy these prepared 
Chinese positions, the U.N. forces must have had prior knowledge of these Chinese movement 
and activity. Thornton argues that this foreknowledge came via American SIGINT intercepts of 
PLA forces, and thus that U.S. military as well as civilian leadership were well aware of the 
Chinese intervention, both before it occurred and in its ongoing stages. So, regardless of any 
hubris or misinterpretation on the part of American political and military leadership, or their 
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supposed lack of receptivity to the largescale Chinese troop presence within Korea, or even the 
likely dysfunction with intelligence agencies and units as Haynes argues, it appears that these 
policymakers and generals knew of and acted on intelligence to this effect. Nonetheless, the 
question remains as to why Truman and administration, along with his military commanders 
(most notably MacArthur), would deny foreknowledge of the PLA intervention, despite that 
events on the battlefield pointed to the contrary. 
Thornton explains the denials from Truman, his administration, and American military 
leadership, most notably MacArthur, with a threefold argument. First, and perhaps foremost, “In 
implementing NSC-68, President Truman had determined to reassert American supremacy in the 
face of a growing Soviet threat.”63 Thornton posits that following MacArthur’s successful 
landing at Inchon in September 1950, “Truman would shift policy from deterrence to 
compulsion—from attempting to keep the Chinese out of the war to keeping them in it. 
Combatting the Sino-Soviet menace was the strategy called for in NSC-68 and Truman would 
act consistently with its precepts, disdaining any opportunity to divide Moscow and Beijing.”64 
Given this argument, had Truman, his administration, or his military commanders acknowledged 
their foreknowledge of the Chinese intervention, the international community and their U.N. 
allies would doubtlessly sought a diplomatic solution to avoiding a Sino-American armed 
engagement, and Truman would have lost his opportunity to implement the directive from NSC 
68, which called for confronting the Sino-Soviet threat. More specific to this effort, in examining 
NSC 68, the document calls for “An improvement and intensification of intelligence activities” 
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against the communist threat.65 To admit to a prior awareness of the Chinese intervention would 
have jeopardized an American opportunity to collect intelligence on three communist foes of the 
United States—Russia, China, as well as the DPRK.  
The second layer to Thornton’s argument involves the precarious support and ever-
increasing concern from American UN allies in Korea over the potential for Chinese intervention 
in the conflict. As previously discussed in Chapter 1, Thornton argues that at an October 15, 
1950 meeting on Wake Island, “Truman must have warned MacArthur not to acknowledge the 
early presence of ‘major’ Chinese forces in Korea should he encounter them, lest the allies 
demand a premature withdrawal.”66 Thornton bases this argument on primary source documents 
indicating that MacArthur’s chief intelligence officer, Maj. Gen. Willoughby, greatly reduced his 
reports of Chinese troop numbers in Korea after this Wake Island meeting relative to those 
submitted beforehand.67 In effect, Thornton argues, in an effort to maintain UN allied military 
and diplomatic support for the U.S. implementation of NSC 68 in Korea, Truman had directed 
MacArthur to ensure that his FEC G2 section’s intelligence estimates reflected those of the CIA, 
which accounted for a Chinese troop buildup along the Sino-Korean border, but stopped short of 
acknowledging a full-scale Chinese military troop deployment on the peninsula. This argument 
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would explain Haynes’ note that intelligence estimates from both the CIA and Willoughby’s 
intelligence section failed to include an imminent Chinese intervention in their analyses.  
This point leads directly to the third and final portion of his argument, that in his 
determination to implement NSC 68 and confront the Sino-Soviet threat in Korea, Truman 
realized that he “obviously could not escape a considerable share of the blame for enlarging the 
conflict with Korea, but he was determined not to take sole responsibility. He had decided…that 
some of that responsibility would be shared by General Douglas MacArthur.”68 In order to set 
the stage for MacArthur sharing this culpability, on October 9, 1950, just six days prior to their 
meeting on Wake Island, Truman authorized a directive from the Joint Combined Services which 
reneged MacArthur’s independent authority, as stipulated in NSC 81/1, to use air and naval 
forces against enemy targets outside of Korea, now requiring the UN commander to “‘obtain 
authorization from Washington prior to taking any military action against objectives in 
China.’”69 This left MacArthur in an impossible military position, effectively requiring the 
general “…to engage major Chinese forces where he would not be permitted to use all of the 
weapons at his disposal,” and ensured that MacArthur would be eager to meet with Truman on 
Wake Island.70  
At a publicized conference on Wake Island, “…Truman managed to elicit from 
MacArthur his views on the possibility of Chinese intervention, that is, the estimate that Truman 
had communicated to MacArthur during their private meeting,” to which MacArthur replied, 
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“‘Very little…’”71 Though MacArthur’s own intelligence, which Willoughby supplied, indicated 
a Chinese “‘capability to intervene’” with “‘heavy concentration’” of forces, “if his commander 
in chief urged him to forward, it follows, promised him support, [MacArthur] would obey.”72 
Unfortunately for MacArthur, and the general U.S. intelligence effort involving the Chinese 
intervention, Truman had laid a political trap for the general in which, “…when the Chinese 
Communists did intervene, Truman would claim that MacArthur had ‘misled’ him.”73 Truman 
had meshed his domestic political agenda with his war strategy in Korea, creating a situation in 
which not even the commander of all American and UN forces in that theater could candidly 
report or act on viable intelligence regarding the very real threat of a largescale Chinese 
intervention. 
In these three arguments, Thornton offers detailed explanations of Truman’s likely 
motivations for refusing to acknowledge that U.S. intelligence had accurately warned him of and 
predicted the Chinese intervention. However, the president’s various acts of meddling in how his 
intelligence agencies reported the imminent Chinese military entry in the Korean conflict 
resulted in flawed PLA troop estimates. As Thornton notes, “When the true dimensions of the 
Chinese presence in Korea were realized, it was too late.”74 Nonetheless, it remains important to 
note that the mistake lay in the number of PLA troops, not that the Chinese intervention was 
imminent.  
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It seems undeniable that in Truman’s determination to implement the directives of NSC 
68 to confront the Sino-Soviet threat in Korea, his directive to MacArthur, in order to avoid a 
withdrawal of UN allied troops, that the general should alter his command’s intelligence to 
reflect CIA assessments which downplayed the Chinese troop presence on the peninsula, and his 
act of domestic political self-preservation in entrapping MacArthur to share culpability when the 
Chinese intervened, the president undermined the accuracy of U.S. intelligence estimates relative 
to the Chinese entry into the war. Contrary to the assertions from Haynes and others positing 
similar arguments, therefore, it seems that the origin of dysfunction in MacArthur’s G2 section 
lay not with Willoughby, but with the president and his obedient commander in the Korean 
theater. These actions from Truman, it might be reasonably argued, constitute a strategic blunder 
in the use of intelligence, as the final products during the period of October and much of 
November 1950, the intelligence estimates and recommendations, did not reflect the true 
battlefield picture in Korea and China’s involvement in it. Provided the strategic context of these 
actions, though, and that Truman’s decision to alter intelligence estimates indicates not only his 
diplomatic acumen and geopolitical awareness of his UN allies’ concerns, but that Truman was 
aware of the genuine numbers of Chinese in Korea—and that he needed to hide this reality in 
order to maintain his UN alliance.  
Mitchell and Thornton explain that through AFSA intercepts of Chinese communications 
as early as July 1950, and evidence that UN forces precisely advanced on occupied Chinese 
positions on three separate pivotal occasions in October and November 1950, U.S. SIGINT 
capabilities allowed the U.S. forces to act effectively on tactical intelligence relative to the 
Chinese military threat in Korea. Despite Truman’s interference in the portrayal of Chinese troop 
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strength within strategic level products, U.S. and UN forces appear to have had access to and 
acted upon accurate tactical intelligence of PLA dispositions.  
*** 
When one comparative analyzes the DPRK, China, Soviet Russia, and the United States 
in their respective uses of intelligence pertaining to the Chinese entry into the Korean War, two 
pairings emerge from the initial assessment. In the DPRK and China, this pair of countries 
appears similar in their catastrophic and ineffective use of intelligence. As for the USSR and the 
U.S., it seems arguable that these two nations, while doubtlessly imperfect in their intelligence 
operations, nonetheless exhibit potential points of relative effectiveness. 
Kim and his DPRK leadership’s failure to even address a formalized command structure 
between their NKA and the Chinese PLA forces prior to December 1950, almost half a year after 
the initial North Korean invasion, represents an indefensible error in the communication of basic 
intelligence information with a key military ally. Further, that Kim and his subordinates 
appointed a foreign national military officer to command their armies in a war on their own soil, 
and thus through whom all North Korean intelligence would assuredly flow, constitutes a failure 
to protect national security intelligence from a foreign power. Such neglect for establishing 
communications with their Chinese military ally, and poor handling of decisions with such deep 
impact on the DPRK’s ability to independently conduct intelligence operations can only be 
assessed as severe strategic intelligence failures directly pertinent to the Chinese intervention.   
Mao and the CCP leadership’s primary error in their use of intelligence lies in Mao’s 
self-professed justification for China’s full-scale military involvement in Korea. Despite 
contradicting NSC 81/1, which outlines the American directives and intentions for U.S. 
involvement in the Korean conflict, Mao based his decision to enter the war on his belief that the 
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U.S. planned to invade China via the Korean peninsula. Such a misinterpretation of American 
intentions, not for a Chinese lack of available intelligence of the combat situation in Korea, 
displays a failure in Mao’s predictive analysis of this intelligence. At a cost of nearly a million 
Chinese troops’ lives, and undoubtedly lengthening the war in its implementation, this 
miscalculation represents perhaps the most prominent, impactful example of ineffective use of 
intelligence throughout the entire war, by any nation. 
In his resolution to withhold information, or even openly acknowledge Soviet-DPRK 
plans of an NKA invasion into the ROK from Mao, some historians argue that Stalin deviously 
manipulated both Mao and Kim into fighting the Americans for Russia. However, in Stalin’s 
attempts keep plans from Mao about the impending NKA invasion, Kim betrayed his promise to 
Stalin to maintain secrecy on the matter, specifically with respect to the Chinese, and informed 
Mao that Stalin had agreed to the North Korean offensive south of the 38th parallel. The resulting 
mistrust within the alliance, and Stalin’s inability to maintain a secret of such a geopolitically 
impactful and sensitive nature, represent a failure in predictive analysis regarding Mao’s 
potential negative reaction upon learning of these plans, as well as a failure to protect strategic 
intelligence, as Stalin had in effect created in withholding the invasion plans from Mao. 
Although Stalin nonetheless achieved his short and intermediate goals “of subordinating China to 
Soviet design and preventing the development of a Chinese-American relationship,” Mao’s long-
term mistrust of Stalin and Soviet Russia would show Stalin’s deceit as an unnecessary gamble 
with drastic consequences for Stalin’s country.75 Mao, based on his own intelligence 
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misinterpretation that the U.S. intended to invade China, appears to have been committed to 
military intervention regardless of whether Stalin was up front with him regarding the NKA 
invasion. By the time the first Chinese troops entered Korea under Mao’s order, it seems certain, 
Mao had moved past true allegiance to the Soviet leader, and was determined thenceforth to 
reject subordination from another foreign power or, most precisely, Soviet Russia.  
As for the United States, the story of the alleged intelligence failure purporting an 
American unpreparedness and lack of prior knowledge of the Chinese intervention, in both 
popular culture and many scholarly circles, is mostly just that—a story. While Truman meddled 
significantly in Chinese troop estimates reported in strategic products, in an effort to implement 
the mandate of NSC 68 to combat Sino-Soviet aggression, avoid a premature allied withdrawal, 
and preserve his domestic political approval, the impact on intelligence involved but a portion of 
the overall strategic intelligence picture. Despite flawed reporting on PLA troop estimates active 
on the Korean peninsula, and contrary the consensus view amongst historians, Truman, his 
administration, and his military commanders such as MacArthur at the very least could not 
ignore the presence of hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops along the Sino-Korean border, 
nor the SIGINT intercepts from the AFSA indicating a largescale Chinese intervention. Further, 
such intercepts almost assuredly explain the ability of UN forces to advance on occupied PLA 
positions in Korea on three separate, crucial occasions during October and November 1950. 
Despite the interference in intelligence dissemination from the executive office, American forces 
proved able to collect, report, and effectively act on tactical intelligence on the Korean 
battlefield.  
Given the profound intelligence failures which the DPRK and China committed 
pertaining to the Chinese intervention, these two nations appear unworthy of consideration in 
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terms of determining which of the four nations most effectively used intelligence at this critical 
juncture in the war. That leaves Russia and the U.S. for the comparative analysis, and as the 
scope of this chapter is restricted to the Chinese intervention, a few points demand attention 
before addressing and comparing each nation’s use of intelligence in the implementation of its 
overall strategy. First, although Stalin achieved his objective of Mao sending PLA troops to aid 
NKA forces in Korea, he did so at the cost of Mao’s trust by failing to protect his invasion plan 
intelligence from Mao, and then revealed that as late as October 1950, the Soviet leader 
continued to fear a Japanese military threat long since subdued through American occupation 
and policy control. Second, Truman’s sabotage of viable intelligence reporting on Chinese troop 
numbers in Korea was indeed a profound mismanagement and undermining of U.S. intelligence 
operations, but this portion of data presented within overall intelligence estimates appears to 
have been confined to strategic, national-level reporting. Truman, his administration, and U.S. 
military commanders were all aware of an imminent threat of a Chinese military incursion into 
Korea due to, at the very least, tactical SIGINT reporting indicative of this development as early 
as July 1950. Moreover, UN forces’ repeated advancement against occupied Chinese positions 
indicates that despite any executive interference involving Chinese troop estimates, U.S. forces 
proved privy to accurate, actionable tactical intelligence.  When objectively compared, Stalin’s 
failures generally indicate a flawed, uninformed grasp on pertinent intelligence, while the U.S., 
with the exception of Truman’s meddling, proved accurate in its intelligence assessments of the 
impending and ongoing PLA troop deployment in Korea.
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Chapter 4: Assessing Overall Strategy 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: MacArthur Greets Truman on Wake Island, October 15, 19501 
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Though arguably a regional war, the strategic implications of the Korean War on the 
belligerents involved therein were undoubtedly on a global scale, as the emerging superpowers 
of the United States and Soviet Russia began to learn how quickly into which the Cold War 
could boil over into heated a conflict. North Korea and China, too, quickly learned how a war 
fought in the shadow of Soviet-American strategic competition could unexpectedly influence 
their own strategic agendas in dramatic ways. Intelligence and the effectiveness in which each 
nation used it would play a decisive role in the outcome of the war, as undefined and as of yet 
undetermined it has proven. 
*** 
Kim Il Sung, unparalleled in terms of power and influence within the DPRK leadership 
by June 1950, dictated North Korean foreign policy and military strategy for his nation during 
the Korean War, provided, as most scholars concur despite Cumings’ arguments to the contrary, 
that Stalin granted his prior approval for any such plans.2 Kim’s primary strategic objective in 
instigating the war through his invasion south of the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950 was to 
overthrow the U.S.-allied ROK government and unify the entire Korean peninsula under his and 
the DPRK’s communist control. Obviously, given the present-day status of the DPRK-ROK 
boundary along the same 38th parallel his NKA forces crossed nearly 70 years ago, Kim proved 
incapable of achieving this most general strategic objective. However, it is Kim’s and the DPRK 
leadership’s use of intelligence towards this goal that this chapter seeks to assess, so a closer 
look at the relevant historical record seems in order. 
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Gaddis cites a January 19, 1950 telegram which the Soviet ambassador to the DPRK sent 
to Stalin, describing Kim’s declaration that the time for a forcible reunification of Korea under 
DPRK control had arrived.3 Although not the first such proposal to the Soviets from Kim, this 
represented the first serious Soviet entertainment of the concept, and that Stalin discussed the 
matter with Mao during the chairman’s visit to Moscow that same month.4 Gaddis also relates 
that when Kim subsequently visited Moscow in April 1950, the DPRK leader and his generals 
assured a likely dubious Stalin that, “‘…the Americans would never participate in the war…”5 
Pantsov and Levine describe how, upon his return from this visit in which Stalin indicated his 
general approval of the North Korean invasion concept, Kim “shrewdly” sent an aide to China to 
inform Mao and the CCP leadership of his and Stalin’s backdoor agreement on the matter, and 
requesting “…only the three Korean divisions in the PLA” as support for the enterprise.6 The 
authors appear to laud this passive-aggressive maneuver, stating, “Kim’s was a clever gambit.”7 
Pantsov and Levine even seem to justify Kim’s confidence in a quick victory over his southern 
brethren, driven by his belief that the Americans would elect a policy of nonintervention.  
Citing a 1966 assessment from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign affairs which details Soviet 
and Chinese involvement in the Korean conflict to support their statements, the authors state, 
“The armed forces of North Korea were clearly superior to the army of South Korean president 
Syngman Rhee. Kim had twice as many troops and artillery pieces, seven times as many 
machine guns, thirteen times as many automatic rifles, six and half times as many tanks, and six 
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times as many planes.”8 Certainly, according to this data, Kim’s military far surpassed that of the 
South Koreans in nearly every measure. 
If one can look past Kim’s miscalculation in his predictive analysis of likely American 
courses of action in the event of an NKA invasion into the U.S.-allied ROK, the DPRK leader’s 
action leading up to the offensive very well might be considered as shrewd or clever, as Pantsov 
and Levine submit. As the authors note, “Kim needed Mao’s help but did not want to become too 
dependent upon the Chinese,” and, “It was impossible to disobey Stalin” regarding Kim’s 
promise to the Soviet leader to keep mum about the invasion plans.9 So, in sending an aide to 
request Mao for the Korean PLA divisions, Kim, while not technically expressly articulating to 
Mao news of the invasion plans agreed upon with Stalin, nonetheless passive-aggressively 
signaled a deductive Mao of these plans, but also, in effect, presented the chairman with an order 
for troops he could not refuse, given Stalin’s implied consent. Kim could thus claim innocence to 
Stalin in breaking his promise of secrecy regarding the invasion, while placing himself in a 
position of power, albeit situational and temporary, over Mao. 
Kim’s “clever,” passive-aggressive handling of sensitive information provided him with a 
temporary advantage over another nation, China, while leaving him with plausible deniability 
should Stalin accuse the North Korean leader of a betrayal of trust. Further, Kim’s assessment of 
DPRK forces versus that of the ROK reflects at least a partial logic-based understanding of the 
intelligence picture through which one can understand his confidence in a quick reunification of 
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Korea. However, as the other half of the foundational justification of this confidence, Kim’s 
assessment that the United States would not intervene militarily in the event of an attack against 
the ROK represents an inexcusable neglect for the geopolitical intelligence picture which 
evolved by the summer of 1950. As Weathersby argues, “In early 1950, U.S. policymakers’ 
concerns about the danger to the United States and its allies from further Soviet territorial 
expansion had been heightened by two events of the previous year, the detonation of the first 
Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949 and the establishment that October of a revolutionary 
communist government in China.”10 Even as Weathersby notes that, in the months preceding the 
June 1950 NKA invasion south, high-level American officials publicly stated “the [Truman] 
administration’s decision not to intervene should North Korea attempt to reunify the peninsula 
by force,” Kim and the rest of world should have taken these statement within the context of the 
growing Cold War tensions between Washington and Moscow, rather than as a definitive 
policy.11  
 With the stakes realistically including global nuclear war, as well as the fate of his own 
regime, Kim’s failure to accurately assess the geopolitical, or even the geographical situation in 
which the invasion would take place seems unfathomable. In June 1950, the Korean peninsula, 
hanging off of the far eastern edge of the Asian mainland continent, held borders with both 
Soviet Russia and Communist China, and sat less than 600 miles from U.S.-occupied Japan. 
When one factors in the events of 1949 which Weathersby mentions, the ascension of Soviet 
Russia as a nuclear power in 1949, along with Mao’s securement of communist control in China, 
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and that multiple U.S. divisions occupied nearby Japan, Kim’s prediction of a passive American 
response to a military invasion and takeover of its one democratic ally in the region outside of 
Japan seems an absurd calculation and a failure to accurately predict his adversary’s intentions 
based on the available intelligence.  
Moreover, Kim’s “clever” passive-aggressive maneuverings within the communist 
alliance in the months leading up to the invasion appear more unnecessary, ego-driven risks than 
calculated, effective uses of sensitive information. After all, Stalin had made clear he would at 
least not stand in Kim’s way in his aims at reunification, and further pledged PLA support to 
Kim should the need arise. Risking the support of his Soviet sponsors, and seeding mistrust or 
resentment, or both, from Mao in his passive-aggressive revelation of the invasion plans through 
his request for Korean PLA troops, Kim ultimately failed to protect intelligence information and 
undermined his allies’ support in so doing.  
When NKA forces faced annihilation as U.N. forces gained the advantage in the fall of 
1950, and Kim finally turned to Mao for PLA support, primary source evidence indicates that 
Kim and the DPRK had failed to even address a joint NKA-PLA command structure at this late 
stage of the war.12 Further, when the Chinese and North Koreans finally established this joint 
command structure in December 1950, nearly six months into the war, Kim allowed Peng 
Dehuai, a Chinese general, to sit as its commander.13 Neglecting to simply address such a vital 
aspect of military operations—establishing who is in command—would alone constitute a failure 
                                                         
12 “Letter from Zhou Enlai to Stalin,” October 14, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
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to communicate information of intelligence value with a primary ally, but when one factors in 
that Kim and the DPRK leadership allowed a Chinese general to command the joint PLA-NKA 
forces, thus sacrificing control of North Korean intelligence to a foreign power, it seems obvious 
that Kim and his subordinates committed an intelligence error of strategic proportions. 
Of all of these failures, of course, the most profound which Kim committed was to 
presume that the Americans would choose to passively allow a forcible takeover of its 
democratic ROK ally. While Kim achieved initial success in the first months of his invasion 
south of the 38th parallel, pushing the Americans and ROK army south into Busan, by mid-
September 1950 MacArthur successfully conducted the landing at Inchon with not only U.S 
troops, but a combined U.N. force with its parent body’s blessing and the international 
community largely supporting it. Kim’s primary strategic objective of reunifying the entire 
Korean peninsula under his communist control never materialized, as he failed in his predictive 
analysis to foresee the NKA facing a military force predominantly composed of the very 
Americans he predicted would refrain to intervene.  
When the war effectively, though not technically, ceased in July of 1953, the same 
latitudinal line along the 38th parallel which divided the DPRK and ROK in June 1950 once 
again divided the two nations. This linear boundary persists as of the writing of this document, 
and one cannot help but wonder whether Kim Il Sung, if he were still alive, might hold regrets 
about his flawed presumption that the Americans would refrain to intervene in his attempt to 
forcefully overtake the entire Korean peninsula. His faulty premise led to a faulty decision to 
initiate the Korean War, and one can safely state that Kim’s ineffective use of intelligence gained 
him nothing strategically and lost he and his nation much. 
***  
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As Michael Sheng explains, determining the strategic motivations of Mao and the CCP 
leadership continues to divide historians along two major argument lines, the “national interest” 
and the “ideology” line, with, of course, many scholars settling on some relative combination of 
the two perspectives.14 For his part, Sheng approaches the topic with an alternative approach, in 
which the historian treats Mao as a proactive “agent” within the decision-making of the Korean 
War, rather than the passive subject of Stalin’s manipulation, a zealous ideologue of Leninism, 
or other such roles in which Mao is portrayed as reactive to external influence.15 With so much 
contention amongst historians regarding Mao’s genuine strategic objectives, one is left to 
examine the historical evidence in order to determine these motivations. Thereafter, the task 
remains to evaluate Mao’s effectiveness in leveraging intelligence towards these objectives. 
In Uncertain Partners, Goncharov and his fellow authors reference an October 24, 1950 
report from Zhou Enlai in which he stated, “Mao’s assessment of the ultimate aim of the 
American military operations in North Korea” to the CCP Politburo in which the premier states, 
“‘Our intelligence is that [the Americans] planned first to cross the 38th parallel without 
provoking China and then to direct their spearhead at China. If [China] did nothing, the 
aggressive enemy would surely continue its advance up to the Yalu River and would devise a 
second scheme [against China].’”16 This statement clearly articulates that Mao based his decision 
to intervene in the Korean conflict based on a flawed assessment of the American intention to 
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invade China on intelligence. This statement identifies Mao’s primary strategic objective for 
entering the war—national defense against a perceived American invasion of China.  
This argument seems to fall somewhere outside of both the national interest and the 
ideology approach to Mao’s objectives for the war, while not going quite as far as Sheng, as seen 
in the scholar’s statement, “The fact that Mao was proactively pursuing an interventionist policy 
long before China’s border security was under direct threat challenges the assumption of the 
‘national interest’ interpretation. I argue that, in addition to being committed to Leninist ideology 
and believing in the inevitability of war with imperialist America, Mao also aspired to be the 
‘Lenin of the East,’…which motivated him to intervene in Korea proactively.”17 Within the 
context of the topic’s historiography, then, the above stated argument fits into Sheng’s “agent” 
approach, minus Sheng’s position that Mao wished to be the “‘Tito of the East.’” 
Having established Mao’s strategic objective of defending China from American invasion 
through a full-scale military intervention in Korea, the chairman’s effectiveness in applying 
intelligence to meeting this goal requires assessment. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, CCP 
leadership telegrams from the fall of 1950 indicate that Mao and his CCP subordinates enjoyed 
ready and consistent access to intelligence pertaining to the Korean battlefield. Further, NSC 
81/1, the document which dictated UN military operations in Korea as of September 9, 1950, 
authorized only air and naval strikes on targets outside of the Korean theater, conspicuously 
omitting land-based attacks, and only in the event of UN forces engaging major PLA forces 
south of the 38th parallel.18 So, one cannot claim that Mao concluded that the U.S. intended to 
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invade China via Korea for a lack of available Chinese intelligence. Further, NSC 81/1 clearly 
shows that the U.S. not only did not intend to invade mainland China, but sought to avoid 
“general war with Communist China” in Korea and in general. Given these arguments, Mao 
clearly committed an intelligence failure in the very act of formulating his overall strategy. Mao 
intervened in the general war in order to prevent an invasion of China which the U.S. never 
intended to undertake.  
When one considers whether Mao achieved his objective of preventing a U.S. military 
invasion of his country through his deployment of PLA troops to Korea, it could be argued that 
because no such invasion ever occurred, Mao achieved this goal by default. However, a more 
poignant perspective might be to consider if, in intervening in Korea, Mao aimed to save at least 
nearly a million of his people. If one accepts this logic, Mao failed to meet is strategic objective, 
as nearly a million Chinese soldiers lost their lives in the Korean conflict.19 Even if one 
dismisses that argument, the strategic objective of preventing an invasion which the U.S. never 
intended to conduct seems a pyrrhic victory given China’s “lost investment and development due 
to the estrangement from the West, which perpetuated Chinese isolation and backwardness for 
decades…”20 Regardless of the spin put on whether Mao achieved his strategic objective of 
national defense against a hypothetical U.S. military incursion, the chairman’s inaccurate 
predictive analysis of available intelligence led him to decide on military intervention in Korea, 
ultimately costing China substantially more than anything it gained. 
*** 
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 Given the control through terror Stalin held over the USSR, when one discusses Soviet 
strategic objectives for Russian involvement the Korean War, one can readily assume that these 
aims were either based on Stalin’s personal judgement or that he approved of them. Stalin’s 
complex web of strategic objectives for Russian involvement in the Korean War appear to have 
included, as Goncharov et. al argue, “to expand the buffer zone along his border, to create a 
spring board against Japan that could be used during a future global conflict, to test the American 
resolve, to intensify the hostility between Beijing and Washington, and, finally and foremost, to 
draw U.S. power away from Europe.”21 Without leveraging intelligence effectively, it seems 
evident that none of these strategic goals could be realistically achieved. 
Following on the line of argument presented in Chapter 3, even amongst his communist 
allies, Stalin exhibited a propensity for secrecy even when such withholding of information 
proved unnecessary, many times detrimental, to his apparent objectives. Given his general lack 
of candidness or outright deceit in nearly all of his communications, examining primary sources 
such as telegrams from Stalin or communiques issued on his orders must be taken within this 
context. However, a select few primary documents appear to reveal much of the Soviet premier’s 
true strategic objectives, and the remainder can be explained logically through the geopolitical 
context of the Korean War era. 
In his irritated response to Mao following the chairman’s October 2, 1950 telegram 
expressing his reluctance to send PLA troops into Korea, Stalin displayed an uncharacteristic 
candidness regarding his continued fear of “Japanese militarism,” which supports Goncharov and 
his fellow authors’ argument that Stalin hoped to use Korea a springboard against Japan in the 
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event of a future world war.22 In this telegram, Stalin also admits that, “‘Of course, I took into 
account…[the possibility] that the USA, despite its unreadiness for a big war could still be drawn 
into a big war…which, in turn, would drag China into the war…’”23 This statement indirectly 
reflects Stalin’s objective of exacerbating tensions between China and the United States in order 
to prevent any alliance or détente between the two nations. The remaining three Soviet strategic 
objectives for the war require explanation outside of any expressly articulated statements from 
Stalin. 
Goncharov et. al argue that given the U.S. military readiness status as of 1950, Stalin 
surmised that “With an army that had been sharply reduced after World War Two, it could not 
run the risk of Soviet retaliation against Western Europe or Japan,” emboldening the Soviet 
leader to test American military resolve.24 Citing the same 1966 report from the Soviet Ministry 
of Foreign affairs as Weathersby, the authors assert that Stalin “…reportedly minimized the 
danger of any such escalation because he had bought Kim Il Sung’s argument that a North 
Korean attack would touch off a revolution in the South, making for a quick and easy 
consolidation of control” of the entire Korean peninsula.25 If Stalin believed that the NKA could 
secure swift control over the entire peninsula, it appears to follow that he would find include 
extending Russia’s buffer zone through a wholly communist Korea within his strategic aims. 
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Moreover, it stands to reason that any conflict in far east Asia involving substantial U.S. forces 
would diminish available American personnel strength in Europe—a desirable and realistic goal 
for Stalin to have at this stage in the Cold War. Thus, all of the strategic objectives for Soviet 
involvement in the war as Goncharov et. al present either directly reflect Stalin’s statements or 
find support through other available historical evidence and arguments. 
Of all the instances in which Stalin leveraged intelligence in an effort to achieve his 
strategic aims for the Korean conflict, perhaps none could be argued as more significantly 
impactful as his expressed consent to a North Korean invasion of the ROK, offered to Kim in 
April 1950, and which the DPRK leader acted upon some two months later. Undeniably, this 
invasion triggered the Korean War, a direct result of which Stalin would witness all but one of 
his primary war objectives completely inversed to Russia’s strategic detriment.  
Within the historiography of the Korean War, historians continue to debate whether 
Stalin expected, or even desired, the United States to intervene in Korea following the NKA 
invasion. Historians such as Gaddis argue that he did not, while others such as Pantsov and 
Levine argue that Stalin not only anticipated, but welcomed the U.S. entry into the war in order 
to embroil the Americans in a costly conflict.26 Given Stalin’s uncharacteristic apparent display 
of emotion, namely frustration, in his reply to Mao’s October 1950 hesitation to send the 
promised PLA troops to Korea, the Soviet leader’s admission of his lack of fear of U.S. 
intervention appears to indicate that Stalin at the very least understood that the prospect of 
American entry in the war was a realistic possibility. Regardless of his level of anticipation for 
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this potentiality, however, Stalin’s allowance for Kim to conduct the invasion reflects his poor 
predictive analysis of the available intelligence in relation to the possible second and third-order 
effects of the invasion. 
When Stalin greenlit Kim to invade South Korea, he inadvertently provided the Truman 
administration with the domestic political capital to implement NSC 68 and its recommendation 
to triple the American defense budget.27 By testing America’s military resolve, Stalin had 
justified this enormous increase in U.S. expenditures dedicated to directly confronting the 
Soviet-Sino threat, a mandate which Truman would take literally and implement through a 
consistent broadening of U.S. military goals in Korea until the ultimate stalemate in 1953.  
By the signing of the war’s armistice, not only had Stalin failed to expand Russia’s 
border with a fully communist Korean peninsula, as the boundary reverted to its original 
delineation along the 38th parallel, but the U.S. established a long term, substantial military 
presence in South Korea following the war, certainly an undesired development in such close 
proximity to the USSR. As for Stalin’s aim to increase Sino-American hostilities, the war 
obviously involved overt military confrontation between the two nations, but Stalin’s stinginess 
with military support and in sharing sensitive information with Mao resulted in the chairman’s 
deep resentment of the Russians and in the Sino-Soviet alliance dissolving into its own hostility 
by the late 1950s. By the early1970s, Mao would welcome rapprochement with the United 
States, reversing one of Stalin’s key intended outcomes of the Korean War completely. The only 
strategic goal Stalin managed to attain through the war was that it drew U.S. military resources 
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and personnel from Europe, although even this seemingly positive outcome was likely negated 
by the vast materiel and funds required from the Soviets to support the PLA and NKA military 
efforts in Korea. Stalin’s decision to consent to Kim’s invasion of the ROK exhibits his failure to 
foresee these second and third-order effects, constituting an intelligence failure with catastrophic 
long-term consequences for the Soviet Union.   
*** 
With the implementation of NSC 68 in April 1950, the United States shifted its strategy 
from an effort to create a wedge between Communist China and Soviet Russia to one wherein 
the U.S. would seek instead to ensure the continuance of the Chinese Nationalist government in 
Formosa (Taiwan), as well as Syngman Rhee’s Republic of Korea. This shift aligned with the 
overall strategy of containment, the restriction of global communist expansionism. When Kim Il 
Sung initiated the NKA invasion of South Korea in June 1950, U.S. policy as specified under 
NSC 68 called for a swift and decisive containment of such a blatant attempt at communist 
expansion, which is exactly what occurred. 
Samuel F. Wells, Jr. posits that the “primary achievement” of the April 1950 publishing 
of NSC 68 was to “…provide a warning of Soviet challenges that might require a significantly 
higher defense budget. This alert had prepared many officials to respond quickly and decisively 
when the North Korean invasion occurred.”28 Alonzo L. Hamby expounds on this line of 
argument, stating that the conflict in “Korea served as a kind of mini-Pearl Harbor, seeming to 
demonstrate that Communist military aggression was a real threat, presumably in Europe as well 
on a small Asian peninsula. By thus creating a sense of national crisis, it made large-scale 
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rearmament a much more feasible proposition politically.”29 These scholarly analyses 
compellingly argue that although the policy foundations of NSC 68 were primed for 
implementation in the spring of 1950, it took the DPRK invasion and the resulting war in Korea 
for the Truman administration to politically justify an authorization of the vast expansion of 
defense expenditures which NSC 68 recommended.  
The clear threat of communist expansionism overtly displayed in the North Korean 
assault on it southern, democratic neighbor led the Truman administration to adhere to NSC 68 
not merely as an excuse for budget increases, but as a comprehensive foreign policy. Beyond its 
call for steep increases in military spending, the containment policy as outlined in NSC 68 
necessitated a strategic pivot, shifting from seeking cooperation with the Chinese an effort to 
undermine a Sino-Soviet alliance, towards a global defense against communist expansionism. 
The conflict in Korea in effect became among the first testing grounds for the containment 
policy, and thus the strategic objectives of the United States’ involvement in the Korean War 
mirror those as detailed in NSC 68. 
The sprawling national security document labeled NSC 68 addresses nearly every 
conceivable aspect of the Soviet threat to the United States as of April 1950. Among the most 
pertinent portions to this discussion is the section outlining potential U.S. courses of action going 
forward from that juncture. The three possible courses of action which the document presents are 
1) a continuation of current policies, 2) isolation, or 3) “a Rapid Build-up of political, Economic, 
and Military Strength in the Free World.”30 After presenting all three courses of actions and their 
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likely outcomes, NCS 68 recommends the third course of action, a rapid buildup of economic, 
political, and military strength among non-communist states in order to contain communist 
expansionism. Addressing the military aspects of this course of action, the document states that, 
“It is necessary to have the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if 
necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total character.”31 This 
direction obviously would include the Soviet-directed NKA invasion of the ROK, as well as the 
Chinese intervention into the Korean conflict.  
The recommendations also state that the U.S. should help “…nations as are able and 
willing to make an important contribution to U.S. security, to increase their economic and 
political stability and their military capability,” as well as, “Place the maximum strain on the 
Soviet structure of power and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the satellite 
countries.”32 Here, NSC 68 obviously applies to the situation in 1950 Korea, as the ROK proved 
willing to fight the DPRK communist threat, and the U.S. engaging militarily against the DPRK 
and China certainly placed significant strain on Russian relations with these two Soviet satellite 
nations. It should be noted that in April of 1950, when the administration published NSC 68, 
U.S. far east policy remained focused on Formosa (Taiwan) and Mao’s China, and the document 
accordingly reflects the general American disinterest and perhaps even ignorance regarding 
Korea at the time.33 Nonetheless, it is not an analytical overreach to view the document through 
the context of the sudden North Korean invasion in June 1950, as this is precisely what the 
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Truman administration did. Almost immediately subsequent to the North Korean assault, 
Truman and his policymakers recognized that the invasion presented them with an opportunity to 
seek huge increases in the defense budget as per NSC 68, and that in turn, NSC 68 provided 
them with a ready-made strategy to confront the communist threats in Korea.  
Perhaps foremost among U.S. strategic objectives in their involvement in the Korean War 
was the NSC 68-recommended containment of communist expansion, which in the specific case, 
meant the prevention of any communist adversary of gaining control over any ground south of 
the 38th parallel on the peninsula. Additionally, Truman and his administration sought to increase 
military funding to facilitate a massive U.S. rearmament in the wake of the post-WWII American 
military draw-down, and in order to maintain U.S. military superiority over the Soviets. Lastly, 
in adherence with the recommendations of NSC 68, once MacArthur successfully conducted the 
landings at Inchon in mid-September 1950, short of total war, the president sought to inflict 
maximum damage to the North Koreans and Chinese before withdrawing U.S. forces south of 
the prewar ROK-DPRK boundary along the 38th parallel. 
In another example of Thornton’s willingness to break from consensus views, the 
historian offers unique insight into the Truman administration’s use of available intelligence, 
especially SIGINT, in its determination to implement the containment strategy in Korea 
following the DPRK invasion. Outside of intelligence obtained through covert collection 
activities, Stalin and Mao made U.S. leadership and the rest of world aware of a formal Sino-
Soviet alliance with the open publication of the agreement’s text on February 14, 1950.34 As 
Thornton notes, the open source intelligence offered through the public declaration of “…the 
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Sino-Soviet alliance was itself sufficient grounds to persuade American leaders to change 
strategy.”35 However, Thornton explains, “President Truman’s twofold decision on January 31 to 
begin a high-priority feasibility study regarding production of thermonuclear weapons…and to 
initiate the formulation of a new geopolitical strategy, came less than fort-eight hours after Stalin 
had sent a telegram to Kim Il-sung granting his approval for war in Korea.”36 This new 
geopolitical strategy, of course, would come in the form of NSC 68. Thornton expounds beyond 
speculation regarding U.S. SIGINT intercepts of Soviet secret communications, stating that 
“…in the spring of 1948, the Army Security Agency, precursor of the National Security Agency, 
in cooperation with the FBI, had a achieved a major breakthrough in its effort to break Soviet 
codes.”37 Thornton quotes FBI Special Agent Robert Lamphere in his memoir as he discloses, “‘I 
can now tell of…the magnitude of the breakthrough that the deciphered KGB messages 
provided…the enemy would never know of our penetration; we would learn in advance his every 
move…’”38 This primary source evidence, along with the open publication of the Sino-Soviet 
alliance document, indicates that Truman realized through multiple sources of intelligence that a 
new U.S. foreign policy was in order, and thus began to shift it in accordance with the tenets of 
NSC 68.  
When Kim Il Sung acted on the consent from Stalin to proceed with a forcible annexation 
of South Korea, this invasion offered the U.S. political justification to implement NSC 68 as its 
effective geopolitical policy. With Truman’s understanding of the intelligence picture now clear 
thanks to open source information and SIGINT intercepts of Soviet communications, and Kim 
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offering an example of communist expansion which seemed scripted by NSC 68, the president 
could justifiably ask Congress for the huge increase to the defense budget which would fund a 
massive U.S. rearmament and ensure continued American superiority over the Soviets. Further, 
the ROK-DPRK boundary remained along the precise longitudinal line as it had been at the 
outset of the war. Truman’s adherence to NSC 68, and the intelligence which facilitated his 
decision to do so, had enabled the president and his administration to achieve these two U.S. 
strategic objectives of the war.  
A variety of factors influenced Truman’s acceptance and authorization of NSC 81/1 in 
September 1950, the document which dictated operations parameters for UN forces in Korea (see 
Chapter 3). Within the context of the Korean battlefield, UN ally concerns over possible Chinese 
intervention was perhaps the most impactful of these factors, resulting in NSC 81/1 as “…a 
series of hedges constructed by the allies against” UN forces pushing north of the 38th parallel.39 
The compromises the U.S. made with its allies in formulating NSC 81/1 also forced Truman to 
direct U.S. intelligence, including personnel under MacArthur, to downplay or even deny 
Chinese troop presence in order to avoid an allied withdrawal from Korea and the potential for a 
unilateral American fight against both the Chinese and North Koreans.  
Though the Truman administration’s intentional falsification of intelligence reports in the 
fall of 1950 would appear to indicate a U.S. intelligence failure, this deliberate skewing of PLA 
troop numbers should not be misconstrued as Truman’s lack of an accurate grasp on the Korean 
intelligence picture. Truman was aware of the imminent Chinese intervention, but realized that 
                                                         
39 Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War 
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 311. 
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true depictions of this development within U.S. intelligence estimates could jeopardize continued 
UN allied support in Korea. Truman was determined to align his war strategy for Korea with 
NSC 68, which required “a sustained, public demonstration of the Communist monolith in 
action.”40  
The president could not allow for the acknowledgement of major PLA forces in Korea, as 
it would likely prompt the allies to seek a settlement with the Chinese, or at least an allied 
military withdrawal, before American forces could confront the communist threat in combat and 
fulfill the directives of NSC 68. Truman ensured that the PLA troop number estimates remained 
low enough within American intelligence reporting to maintain UN allied support in Korea, 
ultimately resulting in a confrontation between U.S. and PLA forces which would cost the 
Chinese exponentially more in terms of loss of human life than that of the Americans. Ironically, 
then, Truman’s deliberate skewing of intelligence proved an effective use thereof, allowing him 
to achieve the strategic objective of inflicting maximum damage to the Communist Chinese 
threat, short of total war. 
*** 
 
Each of the four nations studied here projected distinct and various strategic objectives 
for its involvement in the Korean War, with each experiencing similarly varied levels of success 
in achieving these goals. When one factors in the effectiveness of these nations’ use of 
intelligence towards these ends, it seems clear that possessing a clear and accurate understanding 
                                                         
40 Richard C. Thornton, Odd Man Out: Truman, Stalin, Mao, and the Origins of the Korean War 
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 353. 
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the battlefield, along with the geopolitical context surrounding it, was an indispensable 
component in the process of achieving national strategic objectives.  
Having examined each nation individually through this aforementioned lens, definitive 
conclusions, based on close examination of primary source documents and logic-based 
deduction, have emerged which allow for a concise comparative analysis of these nations against 
one another. North Korea’s clear strategic objective for the war was to invade South Korea, gain 
forcible control and overthrow the ROK government, and reunify the entire peninsula under the 
Kim Il Sung’s communist DPRK regime. Equally clearly, Kim and the DPRK leadership failed 
to meet this objective, as the present-day peninsula remains divided along the 38th parallel. 
Moreover, the DPRK’s military failure stemmed directly from Kim’s intelligence failure to 
anticipate an American military intervention into the war. If nothing else, the presence of 
multiple U.S. divisions in nearby occupied Japan, and that the ROK was essentially a U.S. 
invention via the UN, should have provided ample indication to Kim of an inevitable U.S. 
military response in the event of a North Korean invasion. 
Contrary to Kim’s assessment, Mao not only predicted that the U.S. would intervene in 
Korea, but went one hypothetical step further in his belief that the Americans intended to use the 
peninsula as a springboard to invade China. Mao even based his ultimate justification for 
Chinese intervention in the war on this flawed assessment, and though no American invasion of 
his country ever occurred, NSC 81/1 shows that it was never in the Americans’ plans. Mao’s 
faulty intelligence assessment, based on ample Chinese intelligence, resulting the loss of nearly a 
million PLA soldiers’ lives, along with decades of subsequent international economic and 
diplomatic isolation for the CCP. Given these points, North Korea and China appear to present 
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parallel profiles of strategic failure, both in meeting objectives and leveraging intelligence 
towards those ends. 
Though difficult to ascertain Stalin’s true strategic aims, given his propensity for secrecy 
and deceit even in accessible official Soviet communications from the period, a frustrated 
response to Mao in October of 1950 indicates a rare candidness from the leader, and his 
admission that he at least understood that American entry into the war was a distinct and realistic 
possibility. Despite his apparent foresight that this might occur in general, it seems that Stalin 
neglected to consider the second and third-order effects of offering Kim his consent to invade the 
ROK. Instead of the Russian premier’s objective of creating a security buffer around the USSR’s 
existing perimeter, the war he greenlit resulted in a persistent and substantial U.S. military 
presence in nearby South Korea. While Stalin temporarily attained his goal of increased Sino-
American hostility, his failure to keep his secret invasion plans from Mao, a breach of 
intelligence security bred the chairman’s resentment and led to a Sino-Soviet split by the late 
1950s. Despite his consistent pattern of myopic predictive analysis regarding the detrimental 
ramifications of U.S. entry into the Korean War, Stalin’s shrewd abstention from direct Soviet 
military involvement in the conflict allowed Russia to avoid the relatively catastrophic 
consequences from the war as North Korea and China incurred. In general, though, Russia’s use 
of intelligence towards its strategic Korean War goals appears ineffective and fraught with the 
dysfunction inherent in its one ultimate intelligence analyst and policymaker: Stalin. 
Contrasting with its three communist adversaries in the Korean conflict, the American 
use of intelligence to meet its strategic goals, as outlined in NSC 68, proved effective, even if 
ironically so at times. An FBI special agent’s statements in his memoir and the timing of 
Truman’s call for the creation of the new U.S. geopolitical strategy (NSC 68) less than 48 hours 
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after Stalin sent a telegram to Kim indicating his consent for the NKA invasion compellingly 
suggest that the U.S. had decoded Soviet secret transmissions, and that intelligence gleaned from 
Russian intercepts motivated Truman to seek a new geopolitical strategy—containment. Further, 
NSC 68 offered a strategy seemingly specifically conceived for the Korean War, as Truman 
followed its recommendations to confront communist expansion evidenced by the NKA invasion 
and the Chinese intervention. Truman’s conscious efforts to ensure U.S. intelligence reporting 
downplayed PLA troop numbers in the Korean theater evidenced his foreknowledge of the 
imminent Chinese invasion, as the president realized that his UN allies would seek settlement 
with Mao or withdraw from Korea completely should they learn of the true numbers of Chinese 
soldiers amassed in North Korea. Having thus misled his allies until November 1950, and after 
MacArthur’s successful Inchon landings in September 1950, Truman had set the stage for U.S. 
forces to inflict maximum damage to the Chinese short of total war, per NSC 68.  
The above evidence and arguments convincingly suggest that the U.S., to a significantly 
more profound degree than any of its communist enemies in the war, effectively leveraged 
intelligence to meet its strategic objectives pertaining to the Korean conflict. Moreover, the 
specific primary materials cited regarding Truman’s directive to skew intelligence data for the 
purposes of maintaining allied UN support greatly help to explain the public perception that U.S. 
intelligence failed to anticipate and warn policymakers of the impending Chinese intervention. 
The supposed surprise resulting from the Chinese entering war, it seems, was no failure, but a 
savvy ploy from Truman to keep the UN alliance intact, and confront the communist threat in 
accordance with NSC 68. 
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Chapter 5: Intelligence Failure Diagnosis and the Korean War  
 
 
Figure 4: Summary of Intelligence-Related Failure Types and Characteristics.1  
 
 John A. Gentry defines intelligence failure as when a nation “…does not adequately 
collect and interpret intelligence information, make sound policy based on the intelligence (and 
other factors), and effectively act.”2 The former CIA analyst expounds on the roles different 
actors play within intelligence operations, stating, “Intelligence agencies (with policymakers' 
inputs) have primary responsibility for identifying issues of policy relevance, collecting and 
analyzing information, and issuing warnings. Political leaders analyze intelligence information in 
strategic and domestic political contexts, make decisions under conflicting pressures, and 
manage policy-implementing agencies…”3 With this as a foundational context, Gentry offers his 
own analytical approach to categorizing different types of intelligence failures.  
 As Figure 4 illustrates, Gentry divides intelligence failure into six different types, each 
with a separate defining characteristic and name. In an effort to offer an additional perspective to 
                                                         
1 “Table 1,” as presented in John A. Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed,” Political Science Quarterly 
123, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 249, accessed January 22, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20203011. 
2 Ibid., 248. 
3 Ibid. 
101 
 
 
 
this study, this chapter will apply Gentry’s methodology to the analysis of how effectively the 
DPRK, PRC, USSR, and USA used intelligence in their respective efforts during the Korean 
conflict. Through this categorization of the types and characteristics of the intelligence failures 
identified in the preceding chapters, a more thorough understanding of each nation’s issues in 
this sector emerges, and their relative impact on how that particular nation fared in its role in the 
war. 
*** 
 The analysis of the DPRK’s use of intelligence during the Korean War cumulatively 
identified four major intelligence failures within the events of the NKA invasion of June 1950 
and the Chinese intervention of October and November 1950, as well as within overall DPRK 
strategy for the war. Kim’s decision to initiate the invasion accounted for two of these failures, as 
the North Korean leader went ahead with the assault despite that the Soviet-DPRK war plans 
contained no contingency plans for an American entry into the conflict, or even that the war 
would last more than a few days.4 That Kim persisted with executing the invasion despite overt 
warnings from Mao that the U.S. would intervene constitutes an intelligence failure Type 2, 
“Threat Response,” which entails, “Leaders’ failure to respond effectively to threat warnings, by 
policy or executive action.”5 Failing to plan beyond only a few days into the war represents a 
Failure Type 6, “Vulnerability Amelioration,” which involves “Failure to ameliorate one’s own 
vulnerabilities.”6 This Type 2 failure can also be seen in Kim and the DPRK’s neglect to address 
                                                         
4 Sergei N. Goncharov, John. W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean 
War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 155. 
5 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 78; John A. Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed,” Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 
249, accessed January 22, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20203011.  
6 Gentry, 279. 
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a joint command structure with the PLA before December 1950, and allowing Chinese General 
Peng to command it, along with access to all DPRK intelligence, once it was finally formalized.7 
The categorization of all of these North Korean intelligence failures reveals that the culpability 
for them lies at the executive level, with Kim. The North Korean leader made the decisions based 
on either a dismissal or misinterpretation, but not an ignorance, of available intelligence. 
*** 
 Mao and the CCP leadership, unlike Kim and his North Korean regime subordinates, 
correctly predicted the U.S. entry into the Korean conflict. However, Mao’s promise to Stalin of 
PLA support to the NKA, despite little to no indication of the circumstances under, or the extent 
to which this support might be needed, reflects a failure Type 5, “Vulnerability Identification,” 
which involves the, “Failure to recognize one’s own vulnerabilities in the context of other actors’ 
intentions and capabilities.”8 Further, in a Type 2 failure, Mao’s stated reason for eventually 
sending PLA troops into Korea was based on his poor predictive analysis that the U.S. intended 
to invade mainland China, contrary to the true intentions as outlined in NSC 81/1. As with the 
North Korean ineffective use of intelligence, the Chinese intelligence failures stem directly from 
executive decisions, and Mao bares the blame for their profoundly negative impact on his 
country. 
*** 
 Little to no doubt can be applied to the assertion that the Soviet Union’s use of 
intelligence in its role in the Korean War is synonymous with Stalin’s use thereof. Stalin’s 
                                                         
7 Alexander V. Pantsov, and Steven I. Levine, Mao: The Real Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012), 
377, 379; Sergei N. Goncharov, John. W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean 
War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 345-6. 
8 John A. Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed,” Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 
279, accessed January 22, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20203011. 
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decision to consent to Kim’s NKA invasion of South Korea, based on his misinterpretation of 
NSC 48, reflects a failure Type 5, “Vulnerability Identification,” as the Soviet leader failed to 
accurately interpret American intentions to intervene in the war on behalf of their ROK ally.9 
After the Americans did enter into the war, Stalin committed another Type 5 failure in his belief 
that the Japanese continued to pose a viable military threat to the USSR, and could use the 
Korean peninsula in conjunction with the United States to invade mainland Asia.10 Stalin also 
committed a Type 6 “Vulnerability Amelioration” failure when he allowed Kim to inform Mao 
of the secret DPRK-Soviet plans for the invasion, inciting Mao’s resentment towards Stalin and 
breeding general mistrust within the communist alliance. Again, as with the Chinese and North 
Koreans, all of these Soviet intelligence failures are directly attributable to executive action, and 
thus Stalin’s failures are those of his nation. 
***  
Although detailed study of U.S. intelligence operations involving the Korean War 
indicates no definitive failures, examining the alleged mistakes therein seems appropriate in an 
effort to conduct a balanced comparative analysis of all four countries. U.S. intelligence 
estimates in the months preceding the NKA invasion of June 1950 generally suggested that the 
assault across the parallel was possible rather than imminent, which could be construed and 
argued as an incomplete warning to American policymakers.11 If one accepts such arguments, it 
                                                         
9 Christopher Andrew, and Julie Elkner, “Stalin and Foreign Intelligence,” Totalitarian Movements & 
Political Religions 4, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 83., accessed March 10, 2017, 
http://eds.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.snhu.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=ca30c076-76e6-4888-b9a7-
925342528590%40sessionmgr120&vid=19&hid=104. 
10 Alexander V. Pantsov, and Steven I. Levine, Mao: The Real Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012, 
383. 
11 Erik J. Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 9/11  
and Beyond (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), 69, accessed March 2, 2017, 
http://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=634902&site
=ehost-live&scope=site. 
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would reflect a Type 1 “Threat Warning” failure, which Gentry characterizes as a “Threat 
warning failure by intelligence agencies.”12 The other alleged failure involves CIA estimates 
from the fall of 1950 regarding a Chinese intervention into the war, which deflated PLA troop 
numbers and refrained from outright warnings of an imminent or ongoing major Chinese military 
intervention. Again, this would be a Type 1 failure, which alleges a failure on the part of 
intelligence agencies to adequately warn U.S. leadership of the impending or actual Chinese 
intervention. Setting aside for now the detailed arguments made in previous chapters rebutting 
the notion that these were U.S. intelligence failures, a notable difference between the three 
communist countries and the U.S. emerges. Unlike the DPRK, PRC, and USSR, the U.S. 
intelligence failures discussed here pin culpability on the intelligence agencies, rather than on 
mistakes from U.S. leadership. Even provided one proscribes to the argument that U.S. 
intelligence committed these intelligence failures, Truman and his administration seem to avoid 
any of the blame. 
*** 
Gentry’s methodology proves instructive in categorizing the various failures of the four 
nations subject to this comparative analysis, indicating that the intelligence failures of the three 
communist nations can be directly attributed to actions of their respective leaders, rather than 
blamed on the performance of each nations’ intelligence agencies. In contrast, the alleged U.S. 
intelligence failures cast culpability on only its intelligence agencies for their supposed lack of 
                                                         
12 John A. Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed,” Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 
247, accessed January 22, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20203011. 
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specificity in warning of the NKA invasion in June 1950, and inaccurate assessments of PLA 
troop numbers and Chinese intent to intervene in the fall later that year.  
Again, forgoing the specific arguments asserted in previous chapters, Gentry’s 
methodology reveals that the three communist nations’ use of intelligence stemmed nearly 
exclusively from their individual leaders’ decisions, rather than from a clearly articulated, 
comprehensive policy derived from a collective consensus of policymakers within the Truman 
administration. Whereas NSC 68 drove American intelligence just as it did U.S. military, 
diplomatic, and economic initiatives throughout the Korean War, the three communist nations 
each relied on one man’s ability to incorporate all of the relevant intelligence to form his 
decisions. It is in this difference in collective versus individual policymaking, it seems, that 
America’s superior use of intelligence relative to that of its communist adversaries might be best 
explained.  
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Conclusion 
 
Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin  
and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said  
that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that  
have been tried from time to time… 
 
—Winston S. Churchill  
 
The ongoing American popular perception that the United States committed significant 
intelligence failures during Korean War is certainly understandable, especially given that this 
view continues to persist within the scholarly consensus on the topic. However, historian Richard 
C. Thornton asserts compelling arguments to the contrary, which, when combined with careful 
examination of the relevant primary source evidence, helps to unravel how conscious American 
policy decisions can explain these supposed intelligence failures. Moreover, a comparative 
analysis of the U.S. use of intelligence during the Korean conflict relative to that of its three 
communist adversaries—North Korea, China, and Russia—reveals not only that the U.S. did not 
commit any significant intelligence failures, but leveraged intelligence much more effectively 
than its primary foes during the North Korean invasion, Chinese intervention, and in the pursuit 
of strategic goals.  
The NKA invasion into South Korea on June 25, 1950 reflected multiple serious 
intelligence failures, especially on the part of the North Koreans and Soviets. The two nations 
colluded to form war plans for the invasion which did not include contingencies outside of more 
than a few days, and more importantly, failed to account for the potential of an American 
subsequent entry into the war. For his part, Mao had promised Stalin PLA support of the North 
Koreans, without establishing when, under what circumstances, or to what extent this support 
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might be required. Stalin gaffed in trusting Kim to remain mum on the Soviet-DPRK plans for 
the invasion, resulting in Mao’s resentment when Kim indirectly informed the Chinese chairman 
of the impending assault. U.S. intelligence made Truman and his administration well aware of 
the likelihood of the invasion, and when it occurred, the president implemented the policy of 
containment as outlined in NSC 68. The American military had been preparing for this event for 
months, including the former Army commander in Korea conducting a large-scale exercise 
tailored to a tank invasion, the publication of War Plan SL-17 which specifically addressed a 
North Korean invasion and a U.S. retreat to and defense of the Pusan perimeter, and an Army-
wide emergency preparedness exercised conducted the day prior to the actual invasion. 
Moreover, primary source evidence indicates that U.S. SIGINT assets, in collaboration with the 
FBI, successfully broke secret Soviet communication codes in 1948, and that through subsequent 
intercepts, Truman learned of Stalin’s consent to Kim to initiate the invasion. 
The Chinese intervention into the Korean conflict in October and November of 1950 
reflected Mao’s belief that the U.S. intended to invade China via Korea, despite that NSC 81/1 
clearly displays American caution to avoid total war with the Chinese. Kim Il Sung allowed the 
PLA forces to enter and fight in North Korea without establishing a joint PLA-NKA command 
structure until December 1950, and even then, permitted a Chinese general to command it and 
maintain open access to North Korean intelligence. Just prior to Mao’s final decision to 
intervene, Stalin betrayed his persistent paranoia of a Japanese military threat to Soviet Russia, 
despite the severe American restrictions on Japanese military capabilities and a continued U.S. 
occupation of the island. Although, in the fall of 1950, U.S. intelligence deflated PLA troop 
numbers and downplayed Chinese intentions to intervene in the war, these actions were at the 
behest of Truman, who aimed to allay UN allied concerns over Chinese involvement in the war, 
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and sought to ensure U.S. military engagement with the communist threat as per NSC 68. 
Moreover, U.S. tactical SIGINT allowed American combat units to effectively locate and engage 
previously established Chinese positions in North Korea on three separate occasions in October 
and November of 1950. The U.S. was not only aware of the Chinese intervention, but had 
leveraged intelligence to engage the PLA in combat. 
In terms of achieving overall strategic objectives for the war, the North Koreans utterly 
failed to reunify the Korean peninsula under communist DPRK control, with the boundary 
between North and South Korea returning to its original state along the 38th parallel. Kim 
assumed the Americans would abstain from involvement in the war, and this failure in predictive 
analysis is reflected most poignantly by the present-day demilitarized zone along this 
longitudinal line. Mao believed the U.S. aimed to use Korea as a staging point for an invasion of 
mainland China, and as a result, nearly one million PLA troops perished during the war, and 
China faced economic isolation for decades. Stalin significantly misjudged or dismissed the 
second and third-order effects of his consent for Kim to invade South Korea. The result was a 
persistent U.S. military presence in nearby South Korea, and an enabling of the U.S. to 
implement NSC 68 and the policy containment. The NKA invasion which Stalin greenlit 
provided Truman with domestic political capital to ask Congress for the huge increases in U.S. 
defense expenditures for which NSC 68 called, ensuring the rearmament which would permit the 
U.S. to maintain its military superiority over the Soviets.  
The application of Gentry’s intelligence failure methodology to the U.S. and its three 
communist adversaries reveals that the North Korean, Chinese, and Russian failures stem 
directly from their individual leaders’ actions, while only intelligence agencies bare the blame 
for supposed U.S. failures. These results suggest that whereas the three communist nations’ use 
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of intelligence derived nearly exclusively from their individual leaders’ decisions, the American 
use of intelligence found its guidance in a clearly articulated, comprehensive policy derived from 
a collective consensus of policymakers within the Truman administration. Instead of just one 
man attempting to act on all available intelligence, Truman could turn to NSC 68, a 
collaborative, vetted policy effort designed to further the strategic objectives of his nation. 
Perhaps more than any other factor, it is in this difference in the U.S approach to interpretation 
and leveraging of intelligence that allowed it to avoid the type of intelligence failures its 
communist allies so consistently committed leading up to and during the Korean War. 
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